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1881
VICTORIA
POLICE COMMISSION
SECOND PROGRESS REPORT
OF THE
ROYAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY
INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE KELLY OUTBREAK
THE PRESENT STATE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE POLICE FORCE, ETC.
PRESENTED TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY'S
COMMAND
By Authority:
JOHN FERRES, GOVERNMENT PRINTER, MELBOURNE.
To His Excellency the Most Honorable George Augustus
Constantine, Marquis of Normanby, and Baron Mulgrave of
Mulgrave, all in the County of York, in the Peerage of the
United Kingdom; and Baron Mulgrave of New Ross, in the County of
Wexford, in the Peerage of Ireland; a Member of Her Majesty's
Most Honorable Privy Council; Knight Grand Cross of the Most
Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George; Governor
and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Colony of Victoria and
its Dependencies, &c, &c, &c.
MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY:-
Under date March 7th 1881, Letters Patent were issued by Your
Excellency appointing a Royal Commission, whose powers were thus
defined, viz.:-
1. To inquire into the circumstances preceding and attending the
Kelly outbreak.
2. As to the efficiency of the police to deal with such possible
occurrences.
3. To inquire into the action of the police authorities during
the period the Kelly gang were at large.
4. The efficiency of the means employed for their capture; and
5. Generally to inquire into and report upon the present state
and organization of the police force.
A memorandum, dated 10th May 1881, was subsequently received by
your Commissioners from the Honorable Graham Berry, as follows:-
“The Chief Secretary will be glad if the Police Commission will
submit separately and at their earliest convenience such of
their recommendations as have reference to Mr. Inspector
O'Connor and the black trackers under him, as, in the projected
re-organization of the police arrangements for the North-Eastern
district, it may be found necessary that Mr. O'Connor should be
re-appointed.”
In accordance with the powers thus assigned to them, your
Commissioners have held 66 meetings, and examined 62 witnesses.
In order also to verify, by personal observation, the evidence
of witnesses, and glean information on the spot respecting the
career of the outlaws, your Commissioners visited several
centres of population in the district, including Benalla, Greta,
Glenrowan, Beechworth, Sebastopol and Wangaratta.
Your Commissioners, having taken a large amount of evidence
respecting, and carefully considered the case of, Inspector
O'Connor, had the honour to submit to Your Excellency, on 6th
July last, their First Progress Report, as follows:-
“1. That the evidence before the Commission is not of such a
character as to warrant your Commissioners in recommending the
Honorable the Chief Secretary to appoint Mr. Stanhope O'Connor
to the position of an inspector of police in the Victorian
Service.
“2. Your Commissioners are of opinion that the Government should
make provision for the permanent employment of black trackers as
an auxiliary branch of the police service; care being taken that
they shall be trained to habits of subordination, and made
amenable to the general discipline of the force.
“Your Commissioners would also recommend:-
“3. That, as far as practicable, a thorough system of police
patrol shall be established throughout the colony, more
especially in the North-Eastern District.
“4. That immediate steps be taken by the Government to arm the
mounted police of the colony with the Regulation Pattern
Martini-Henry carbine; that the entire force shall be instructed
in the use of the weapon by means of regular drill and
periodical target practice; and that a reasonable quantity of
ammunition shall be served out to each man for such practice.”
Your Commissioners have now the honour to submit their Second
Progress Report as follows:-
1. That immediately prior to the Kelly outbreak, and for some
time previously, the administration of the police in the
North-Eastern District was not satisfactory, either as regards
the numbers and distribution of the constabulary, or the manner
in which they were armed and mounted; and that a grave error was
committed in abolishing the police station at Glenmore, and in
reducing the number of men stationed at Stanley, Yackandandah,
Tallangatta, Eldorado, and Beechworth.
2. That the conduct of Captain Standish, as Chief Commissioner
of Police, as disclosed in the evidence brought before the
Commissioners, was not characterized either by good judgment, or
by that zeal for the interests of the public service which
should have distinguished an officer in his position. The
Commission attribute much of the bad feeling which existed
amongst the officers to the want of impartiality, temper, tact,
and judgment evinced by the Chief Commissioner in dealing with
his subordinates, and they cannot refrain from remarking that
many of the charges made by Captain Standish in his evidence
before them were not sustained in his late examination, and were
disproved by the evidence of other witnesses.
3. That Mr. Nicolson, Assistant Commissioner, has shown himself
in many respects a capable and zealous officer throughout his
career in the force, but he laboured under great difficulties
through undue interference on the part of Captain Standish, and
the jealousy occasioned by that officer's favouritism towards
Superintendent Hare. The want of unanimity existing between
these officers was frequently the means of preventing concerted
action on important occasions, and the interests of the colony
greatly suffered thereby. In view of these facts, the Commission
do not think that the force would be benefited by re-instating
Mr. Nicolson in the office of Acting Chief Commissioner of
Police. Further, your Commissioners recommend that, in
consequence of his impaired constitution, caused by hardships
endured in the late Kelly pursuit, Mr. Nicolson be allowed to
retire on his superannuation allowance, as though he had
attained the age of 55 years.
4. That the charge made by Superintendent Hare in his official
report, dated 2nd July 1880 -viz., that “Mr Nicolson, Assistant
commissioner, gave me (Hare) no verbal information whatever when
at Benalla”- has been disproved by the evidence.
5. That Superintendent Hare's services in the police force have
been praiseworthy and creditable, but nothing special has been
shown in his actions that would warrant the Commission in
recommending his retention in the force, more especially when
the fact is so patent that the “strained relations” between
himself and Mr. Nicolson have had such a damaging influence on
the effectiveness of the service. This feeling is not likely to
be mitigated after what has transpired in the evidence taken
before the Commission; and we would therefore recommend that
Superintendent Hare be allowed to retire from the force, as
though he had attained the age of 55 years, and that, owing to
the wound he sustained at Glenrowan, he receive an additional
allowance of 100 pound per annum, under clause 29 of the Police
Statute (No. 476).
6. That the evidence discloses that Superintendent Sadleir was
guilty of several errors of judgement while assisting in the
pursuit of the Kelly gang; that his conduct of operations
against the outlaws at Glenrowan was not judicious or calculated
to raise the police force in the estimation of the public. That
the Commission are further of opinion that the treatment of
Senior-Constable Kelly and Johnson, by Superintendent Sadleir,
was harsh and unmerited. Your Commissioners therefore recommend
that Superintendent Sadleir be placed at the bottom of the list
of superintendents.
7. That a most favourable opportunity of capturing the outlaws
at a very early period of their career of crime, namely, on the
4th November 1878, was lost, owing to the indolence and
incompetence of Inspector Brook Smith. Your Commissioners
consider that Inspector Brook Smith committed a serious blunder
in not having started in pursuit of the outlaws immediately upon
receiving information of the gang having been seen passing under
the bridge at Wangaratta, and also in not having properly
followed up the tracks of the outlaws in the Warby Ranges, a
proceeding which would have warranted your Commissioners in
recommending his dismissal from the force. Your Commissioners,
however, having in view his former services, recommend that
Inspector Brook Smith be called on to retire on a pension of 100
pound per annum.
8. That, in the opinion of the Commission, Detective Ward, while
he rendered active and efficient service during the pursuit of
the gang, was guilty of misleading his superior officers upon
several occasions, more especially in connection with Mr.
Nicolson's cave party, Mr. Hare's hut party, and the telegram
forwarded to Senior-Constable Mullane by Mr. Nicolson when the
latter was superseded on the 2nd of June 1880. The Commission
therefore recommend that Detective Ward be censured and reduced
one grade.
9. That in the opinion of your Commissioners the conduct of
Sergeant Steele was highly censurable in neglecting to take
action when, on his arrival at Wangaratta, on the 4th November
1878, he received reliable information that the outlaws had been
observed on the previous morning passing under the One-mile
bridge at Wangaratta. There was no reason why, as he had a large
body of well-armed troopers under his command, and was then
actually engaged in the search for the outlaws, he should not
have gone immediately in pursuit. The tracks were plainly
discernible; the men observed were undoubtable the outlaws, and
had they been followed they would most probably have been
overtaken in the Warby Ranges, in as much as their horses and
themselves were exhausted by their journey to and from the
Murray. Sergeant Steele had full power to act upon his own
discretion, and there can be little doubt that, had he exhibited
judgment and promptitude on that occasion, he would have been
the means of capturing the gang, and preventing the loss of life
and the enormous expenditure of money incurred subsequently in
the extermination of the outlaws. Your Commissioners therefore
recommend that Sergeant Steele be reduced to the ranks.
10. That the Constables who formed the hut party on the night of
Aaron Sherritt's murder — viz., Henry Armstrong, William Duross,
Thomas Patrick Dowling, and Robert Alexander — were guilty of
disobedience of orders and gross cowardice, and that the three
latter — Constable Armstrong's resignation having been accepted
— be dismissed from the service.
11. That the entries made by Superintendent Sadleir in the
record sheets of Senior-Constables Kelly and Johnson be
cancelled, and the Commission recommend these members of the
force to the favourable consideration of the Government for
promotion.
12. That the Commission approve of the action taken by Constable
Bracken when imprisoned by the Kelly gang in Mrs Jones's hotel,
at Glenrowan, and recommend him for promotion in the service.
13. That in consequence of the reprehensible conduct of Mr.
James Wallace, the State School teacher of Hurdle Creek, during
the Kelly pursuit, and his alleged sympathy with the outlaws,
together with the unsatisfactory character of his evidence
before the Commission, your Commissioners think it very
undesirable that Mr. Wallace should be retained in any
department of the public service. We therefore recommend his
immediate dismissal from the Education Department.
14. That the conduct of Mr. Thomas Curnow, State School teacher,
in warning the special train from Benalla to Beechworth on the
morning of the 28th of June 1880, whereby a terrible disaster,
involving the probable loss of many lives, was averted, deserves
the highest praise, and the Commission strongly recommends that
his services receive special recognition on the part of the
Government.
15. The Commission desire to record their approval of the
conduct of Mr. C. H. Rawlings during the attack upon the
outlaws, and consider that his services deserve some
consideration at the hands of the Government.
16. The Commission desire also to express their approval of the
assistance rendered to the police at Glenrowan by the members of
the press present.
17. That your Commissioners desire to record their marked
appreciation of the courtesy and promptitude displayed by the
Queensland Government in forwarding a contingent of native
trackers to Victoria to aid in the pursuit of the outlaws. We
take this opportunity of expressing our approval of the services
of the black trackers as a body, and deeply regret that any
misunderstanding amongst the officers in command of operations
in the North-Eastern district should have led to unpleasant
complications. The Queensland contingent did good service, and
Your Commissioners trust that the Victorian Government will not
fail to accord them proper recognition.
FRANCIS LONGMORE, Chairman;
WILLIAM ANDERSON,
JAMES GIBB,
GEORGE WILSON HALL,
GEORGE RANDALL FINCHAM,
EDWARD JOHN DIXON,
GEORGE COLLINS LEVEY,
JAMES WILLIAMS,
Secretary.
Your Commissioners, in lieu of the usual resume of the evidence,
have the honor to submit to Your Excellency the following sketch
of the antecedents, pursuit, and destruction of the Kelly gang
of outlaws:-
1.-THE KELLY FAMILY
Among the many predisposing causes which operated to bring about
the Kelly outbreak must be included the unchecked aggregation of
a large class of criminals in the North-Eastern district of
Victoria, all of whom, either by ties of consanguinity or
sympathy, were identified with the outlaws. The origin and
settlement in the colony of the Kelly family therefore deserves
some passing notice at the hands of your Commissioners. James
Quinn, the grandfather of Edward and Dan Kelly the outlaws, was
a native of the county of Antrim, Ireland. With his wife and
family, consisting of six children, he arrived in Victoria in
1839. He, in the first instance, resided in Pascoe Vale, and
earned a subsistence by the cartage and sale of firewood in
Melbourne. In 1845, he settled in Wallan Wallan, in the Kilmore
district, where he rented a small farm, and was enabled in the
course of a few years to purchase the freehold of 700 acres of
land in that locality. In 1863, by which time his family had
increased to ten children, four sons and six daughters, he
realized the landed property which he possessed, and with the
proceeds, amounting to about 2,000 pounds, took up the Glenmore
run, situated in a remote part of the North-Eastern district.
The precise object of this migration has not been ascertained;
but it is believed that Quinn, having become notorious as a
cattle stealer in the Kilmore district, was desirous of escaping
from police surveillance; and, by removing back to the borders
of settlement and civilization, to secure for himself and his
associates a safer and more extended field of operations. The
sons of old Quinn were named respectively - Patrick, John, James
and William; the daughters were - Mary Anne; Catherine, married
to John Lloyd; Ellen, married to John Kelly, the father of the
outlaws; Jane, married to Tom Lloyd; Margaret, married to Pat
Quin; and Grace. Numerous progeny was the result of the
marriages contracted by the children of the elder Quinn, which
accounts for the Kelly family being described as the most
prolific in the district. James, the third son of old Quinn,
became an object of interest to the police so far back as 1856;
and from that date down to 1879, when he was incarcerated under
the Felons Apprehension Act as a Kelly sympathizer, there were
recorded against him no less than 16 arrests, and ten
convictions for various offences, many of them of a serious
nature, involving terms of imprisonment amounting to about nine
years. John Quinn, though frequently before the courts, has
escaped conviction, but when residing at Wallan he was regarded
by the authorities as the organizer of many of the depredation's
in which the members of his family were concerned. John Kelly,
who married Ellen, the third daughter of the elder Quinn, and
who was the father of the outlaws, was a convict, having been
transported from Tipperary, Ireland, to Tasmania, in 1841, for
an agrarian outrage, stated to have been shooting at a landlord
with intent to murder. He worked as a bush carpenter for a time
after arriving in Wallan , and subsequently turned his attention
to gold digging, at which he was successful, and was enabled to
purchase a small freehold at Beveridge. Here he became notorious
as an expert cattle stealer, and his house was known as the
rendezvous of thieves and suspected persons. In 1865, he was
convicted of cattle stealing, and sentenced to six months'
imprisonment in Kilmore gaol. He died shortly after his release.
At his death he left seven children, namely Edward and Dan (the
outlaws), James, Mrs. Gunn, Mrs. Skillion, Kate and Grace. Mrs.
Kelly, upon the death of her husband, settled at the Eleven-mile
Creek, near Greta, where, with the younger portion of her
family, she at present resides. Her place was regarded for years
as the resort of lawless and desperate characters, including
Power, who is said to have given Ned Kelly his first lesson in
bushranging. Edward Kelly, the leader of the outlaws, was born
in 1854, at Wallan Wallan, and from an early age was regarded by
the Police as an incorrigible thief. In company with Power the
Bushranger he, on the 16th of March 1870, robbed Mr. McBean; and
on the 25th of April stuck up Mr, John Murray of Lauriston.
Kelly was arrested for the latter offence on the 4th of May
following, but escaped conviction owing to want of
identification. He was implicated in several outrages; and at
Beechworth, in 1871, he received a sentence of three years for
receiving a stolen horse. He led a wild and reckless life, and
was always associated with the dangerous characters who infested
the neighbourhood of Greta until the shooting of Constable
Fitzpatrick, on the 15th of April 1878, when he took to the
bush. Daniel Kelly was born in 1861, and from the age of
16 years was, with his elder brother Ned, a noted criminal.
Joseph Byrne, the third outlaw, was born in 1857, and lived with
his parents, who were Irish extraction and respectable
antecedents, at the woolshed, about seven miles from Beechworth.
When 16 years of age he was in trouble, and from the first
appears to have developed vicious and cruel propensities. In
1876, along with Aaron Sherritt, who figures so prominently
throughout the Kelly campaign, so to speak, and with whom he was
on terms of the closest intimacy, he was arrested and sentenced
to six months' imprisonment for having stolen meat in his
possession; and he was also believed to have been connected with
numerous cases of horse stealing in the North-Eastern district,
which ultimately led to his joining the Kelly gang. Steve Hart,
the fourth member of the gang, was born in 1860, and was the
second son of Richard Hart, of Three-mile Creek, near
Wangaratta. Stephen, at an early age, became the associate of
disreputable persons, and carried on a system of stealing horses
and planting them until such time as rewards were offered by the
owners for there recovery. He received a sentence of
imprisonment in July 1877, and subsequently was sent to gaol for
ten months for horse stealing. On his release he returned to
Wangaratta, and for a time appeared disposed to lead a more
honest and reputable life. One day, however, while at work
cutting timber, he suddenly threw down his axe, exclaiming to
his mate, “A short life and a merry one.” He then rode off,
stating that he was going to New South Wales. Nothing further
was heard of him until the murders of the police at Wombat, when
it was reported that a man answering to his description was seen
near Greta; but it was not until the Euroa bank robbery that his
identity was established as one of the accomplices of the
murderers, Ned and Dan Kelly.
II.-THE KELLY COUNTRY
That portion of the North-Eastern district known as the Kelly
country may be said to embrace the triangular tract lying
between the points formed by the townships of Mansfield,
Benalla, and Beechworth, together with the country lying to the
west of the line of railway which extends to the Murray,
including the vicinity of Lake Rowan, the Warby Ranges, and the
neighbourhood of the Woolshed. This constitutes a large and
diversified extent of territory, measuring about 1,600 square
miles. It is in parts well suited for agricultural purposes, and
settlement of late years there has been rapid and permanent; but
in the main, especially to the north-east, it consists of
mountain ranges with innumerable spurs, forming steep ravines
and slopes so heavily timbered, covered with scrub, and
encumbered with huge boulders, that for the greater part it is
almost inaccessible. The country is intersected by numerous
creeks and rivers; and recently bush tracks have been cut, and
roads capable of vehicular traffic constructed; land has been
taken up eagerly, and an intelligent, honest, and hard-working
population is steadily settling on the soil. It was, however,
evident from the first that the peculiar characteristics of the
country afforded special facilities for the operations of such
lawless characters as the Quinns, the Lloyds, and the Kellys,
who, if pursued by the police, could seek refuge in the vastness
of the mountains and defy all the attempts of the authorities to
arrest them. The district lying to the north and north-west of
Mansfield, in the vicinity of which Sergeant Kennedy and
Constables Lonigan and Scanlan were murdered by the Kelly gang,
is exceptionally wild and broken. Here the various branches of
the Broken River, the King River, and some smaller streams take
their rise, flowing in a northerly direction, while the
principal ranges trend in lines nearly parallel with their
courses. In this isolated and still sparsely-inhabited spot, not
far from the junction of the right and left branches of the King
River, and about 40 miles from Mansfield, Glenmore is situated.
The homestead of the elder Quinn lay directly in the track - the
only one existing in the early days - between Mansfield and the
Murray. It was principally utilized by cattle stealers, who,
owing to the rugged and inhospitable character of the country,
were enabled to pass to and fro without risk of being
intercepted by the police. The arrest of Power the bushranger
pointed to the necessity for a police station at Glenmore. In
1870 one was accordingly erected, and two constables placed in
charge, with the results highly satisfactory. The proximity of
the police became intolerable to the criminals in the
neighbourhood, and various means were adopted unavailingly to
induce the Government to withdraw them, until finally the Quinns
sold out and left the district. The policy of abolishing the
Glenmore police station has been frequently adverted to in the
course of the evidence; and, with due regard to all the
circumstances, it seems to your Commissioners to have been a
grave error of judgment on the part of Captain Standish, the
Chief Commissioner of Police, to have consented to its removal.
In 1872 Superintendent Barclay strongly recommended the
abolition of this station, on the grounds that the place was
remote from settled population, that there was no crime in the
neighbourhood, and that its maintenance was unnecessarily
expensive. Acting upon the advice of his subordinate officers,
and that of many respectable residents in the locality, the
Chief Commissioner declined to accept Superintendent Barclay's
suggestion. In 1875 the representations of this superintendent
proved more successful. He directed Inspector Brook Smith to
report on the subject. The views of the latter coincided with
those of his superior officer, and, upon their recommendations,
supported by the opinions of certain residents in the district,
Captain Standish, in a memo. dated 17th November 1875, approved
of the removal of the Glenmore station to the place recommended
by Superintendent Barclay, viz., three miles above the Hedi
station. The inadvisability of this step should have been
apparent to Captain Standish at the time, inasmuch as he must
have been aware of the state of the district. For many years
anterior to the outbreak offences against the person were of
frequent occurrence in the North-Eastern district. It was the
scene of the exploits of many notorious criminals and
bushrangers, and horse and cattle stealing was carried on
systematically by gangs of thieves who acted in concert on both
sides of the River Murray. Those engaged in the traffic were
associated with the families of the Quinns, the Lloyds, and the
Kellys, and constituted a “ring” that became a standing menace
to the respectable and law-abiding people of the district. A
return compiled from official documents shows the extent to
which cattle stealing prevailed in the Kelly country for eight
years prior to the outbreak. In 1871 the number of cases of
cattle stealing reported was 101; 1872, 108; 1873, 97; 1874, 80;
1875, 93; 1876, 130; 1877, 132; and 1878, 101. It is true that a
certain percentage of the animals missing, and reported as
having been stolen, were subsequently found, but there seems
every reason to conclude that in the majority of instances
horses disappearing, if not permanently appropriated by the
criminal classes, were freely taken and utilized as occasion
served, and were then turned adrift into the bush, where they
were sometimes recovered by the owner. The plan frequently
adopted was to drive mobs of stolen cattle from Victoria across
the Murray, where they were impounded by the New South Wales
police. In due course they were disposed of, when the thieves
attended the sale, and purchased the animals at a nominal price.
Fortified against prosecution by possessing the sale note
obtained from the poundkeeper, they retraced their steps to
their homes, carrying with them the fruits of their criminal
enterprise. Cattle stealers across the border pursued a similar
system, driving the cattle lifted in New South Wales into
Victoria, purchasing them when sold by the poundkeepers,
effacing the brands, and taking them back to the districts from
which they had been stolen. In 1877, Inspecting Superintendent
Nicolson drew attention to the prevalence of this description of
crime in the North-Eastern district, which drew forth a strong
remonstrance from Captain Standish, addressed to the officers in
charge of the North-Eastern district. Numerous witnesses,
notably Captain Standish and the Hon. J. H. Graves, have deposed
to the almost incredible extent to which for many years cattle
stealing was carried on with impunity in the North-Eastern
district; nevertheless, not only was the Glenmore station
abolished, but the strength of many other police stations in the
district was reduced. Further, excellent and experienced members
of the force were removed from important centres and replaced by
others wholly incompetent and unacquainted with the district.
III.-CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK
In the opinion of your Commissioners, the abolition of the
Glenmore station, the reduction of the numerical strength of the
force in the district, and the substitution of inexperienced and
inferior constables for those more competent, necessarily
weakened that effective and complete police surveillance without
which the criminal classes in all countries become more and more
restive and defiant of the authorities. The incident, however,
which seems to have more immediately precipitated the outbreak
was the attempt of Constable Fitzpatrick to arrest Dan Kelly, at
his mother's hut, on the 15th of April 1878. This constable
appears to have borne a very indifferent character in the force
from which he was ultimately discharged. Mr. Fosberry, the
Inspector-General of Police, New South Wales, and Captain
Standish express in strong terms their adverse opinions of
Fitzpatrick, while the present Acting Commissioner of Police.
Mr. Chomley, writes a valedictory memo. on his papers,
describing him as a liar and larrikin. To this man was
entrusted, in April 1878, the temporary charge of Greta, the
very focus of crime in the district. He had been stationed at
Benalla, and prior to starting for Greta he appears to have had
an interview with Sergeant Whelan, the sub-officer in charge,
relative to his duties. Whelan, in his evidence, is somewhat
contradictory upon the point as to whether Fitzpatrick was
justified in attempting to arrest Dan Kelly under the
circumstances. In almost the one breath he states that the
constable was wrong in going to the Kelly's hut, and then urges
that it was his duty to act as he did. The arrest was attempted
to be made in consequence of a Gazette notice to the effect that
a warrant had been issued at Chiltern against Dan Kelly and Jack
Lloyd, on a charge of suspected cattle stealing. Sergeant Lynch,
at Chiltern, considered that the men alleged to have been seen
driving certain horses through the township answered the
description of those men, and warrants for their
arrest were issued accordingly. Fitzpatrick's efforts to fulfil
what he may have considered his duty proved disastrous. He was
entrapped by accepting the invitation to accompany Dan Kelly
into the hut, where he was attacked by several members of the
family, and shot in the wrist by Ned Kelly. Warrants were in due
course issued against Fitzpatrick's assailants; and those
arrested, including Mrs. Kelly and a relative named Williamson,
were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for the offence of
assault with intent to kill. The alleged severity of the
punishment inflicted upon the mother of the outlaws has been
subject of comment in the course of the inquiry, and Captain
Standish considers that it formed one of the many causes which
assisted to bring about the Kelly outrages. One point in this
matter should not be overlooked. Jack Lloyd, who was implicated
in the alleged case of horse stealing for which Fitzpatrick
sought to arrest Dan Kelly, was subsequently taken into custody,
and, the charge having been investigated, he was discharged.
There can be little doubt that Constable Fitzpatrick's conduct,
however justified by the rules of the service, was unfortunate
in its results. It may also be mentioned that the charge of
persecution of the family by the members of the police force has
been frequently urged in extenuation of the crimes of the
outlaws; but, after careful examination, your Commissioners have
arrived at the conclusion that the police, in their dealings
with the Kellys and their relations, were simply desirous of
discharging their duty conscientiously; and that no evidence has
been adduced to support the allegation that either the outlaws
or their friends were subjected to persecution or unnecessary
annoyance at the hands of the police.
IV.-THE WOMBAT MURDERS
In July 1878 a change was effected in the police arrangements of
the country districts. Beechworth and Mansfield and a portion of
Kilmore were combined, forming the North-Eastern district, and
Superintendent Sadleir placed in charge, with his head quarters
in Benalla. Mr Sadleir, upon taking charge, found warrants had
been issued against Ned and Dan Kelly for the assault upon
Constable Fitzpatrick in the previous April. He at once
communicated with the Chief Commissioner, asking for the
assistance of a detective to discover the whereabouts of the
offenders, and Detective Ward, owing to his previous knowledge
of that part of the country, was selected for the purpose. In a
communication dated 17th October 1878, Inspector Secretan
suggested to Superintendent Sadleir that an organized search
should be made about Greta, the Fifteen-mile Creek, and from
thence to Mansfield, as it was reported that one, if not the two
Kellys had been seen there. This was all the information that
Sergeant Kennedy and his party possessed when, on the afternoon
of the 25th October, they started from Mansfield charged with
the duty of arresting the Kellys. Although early in August an
expedition to search the country between Mansfield and Greta had
been proposed, various matters had interfered with the project
being carried out. In reply to a communication from
Superintendent Sadleir, in October, Sergeant Kennedy intimated
that the only feasible plan of effecting the arrest was by
establishing a depot at some distance beyond the Wombat, say
near Stringy Bark Creek. This he pointed out, would enable the
party to keep up a continuous search between that spot and the
flat country towards the King River, the Fifteen-mile Creek, and
Holland's Creek. He urged that, while the Mansfield men would be
searching the ranges and creeks in that neighbourhood, the men
forming the party to be despatched from Greta could co-operate
on the flat country. Sergeant Kennedy's suggestion was approved
of by his superior officer, and on 18th of October
Superintendent Sadleir issued final orders to guide the search
parties. Two parties of police were to start simultaneously -
one, consisting of Sergeant Kennedy and Constables Lonigan,
Scanlan, and McIntyre, from Mansfield, and the other, in charge
of Senior-Constable Shoebridge, from Greta. The spot indicated
by Sergeant Kennedy for the purpose of a camp was, therefore, of
his own selection, and the arrangements generally left to
himself. On reaching the site of the proposed depot, at Stringy
Bark Creek, measures were adopted by Sergeant Kennedy for
camping there for the night. It seems clear that Kennedy had no
knowledge of the presence of the Kelly's in the locality. He
took no precautionary measures against surprise. He seems to
have acted with a singular disregard to possible contingencies.
He not only divided his party, but allowed McIntyre to fire off
his rifle at some birds, thus attracting the Kellys to the spot.
The party was armed each with the regulation revolver, having
beside a Spencer repeating rifle and a double shot gun.
Considering that they anticipated meeting only the two Kellys,
and that probably no more than a show of resistance would have
been offered, those arms were considered sufficient for every
purpose; but the absence of foresight, of proper discipline or
precaution, enabled the gang to take the party in detail, and,
consequently, at a disadvantage. There seems no reason to
suppose that the murders were the result of premeditation; the
men were shot down when, with an instinctive sense of duty, they
endeavoured to repel the attack of their assailants. The
cold-blooded despatch of the brave but ill-fated Kennedy when,
wounded and hopeless of surviving, he pleaded to be allowed to
live to bid farewell to his wife and children, is one of the
darkest stains upon the career of the outlaws. It was cruel,
wanton, and inhuman, and should of itself, apart from other
crimes, brand the name of his murderer, the leader of the gang,
with infamy.
V.-AFTER THE MURDERS
The action of the police immediately after the Wombat murders
proved the utter unpreparedness of the authorities for so grave
an emergency. The constables were found armed with revolvers
that, under the circumstances were comparatively useless. A few
rifles were scattered throughout the district, but such was the
inadequacy of the armament available that upon the departure of
Kennedy on his fatal expedition, the station at Mansfield was
almost completely denuded of weapons. The parties who went out
to search for the bodies of the murdered men were wretchedly
equipped, and, before starting, the whole township had to be
searched in order to obtain arms. The majority of the police
were unacquainted with the use of the more modern description of
rifle, and were, in many instances, notoriously bad bushman, and
ignorant of the country in which they had to search for the
outlaws. Some also were indifferent horsemen. As soon as
information reached Melbourne of the Wombat murders. the Hon.
Graham Berry, who was then Chief Secretary, gave the Chief
Commissioner carte blanche, as regarded expense, to enable him
to cope with the situation. Some Spencer repeating rifles that
were in store were forwarded, and reinforcements were despatched
to the scene of operations. Mr. Nicholson, the Assistant
Commissioner of Police, who had done good service in the capture
of bushrangers in the early days of the gold diggings, was
specially selected to take charge of the pursuit. On arriving in
Benalla, he found the township in a state of intense excitement,
which was shared in more or less by the general community. At
this time the mounted police in the North-Eastern district,
which embraced an area of 11,000 square miles, numbered only
about 50 mounted men, and the reinforcements came to hand
slowly. Having visited the more important stations, Mr Nicolson
proceeded to form search parties with whom to scour the country
according as information was received as to the supposed
whereabouts of the gang. The officers in the district at this
time, in addition to Mr. Nicolson and Mr. Sadleir, were
Inspector B. Smith and Sub-Inspector Pewtress. Mr. Smith, as
subsequent events proved, was quite inefficient for the work,
and Mr. Pewtress was wholly unsuited for bush duty. The police
parties sent in pursuit in the first instance returned to
Quarters without success, and no reliable information appears to
have been obtainable as to the whereabouts of the gang. The
Government, it must be said, exhibited a commendable zeal and
promptitude in seconding the efforts of the police. The better
to facilitate their object, the Felons Apprehension Act was
passed through the legislature at one sitting. The measure was
based upon one that in New South Wales was found very effectual
in stamping out bushranging. Its provisions were directed
against not only the outlaws, but also against all those who
wilfully harboured, assisted, or otherwise sympathized with
them; and, doubtless, had it been judiciously administered, the
object aimed at would soon have been achieved.
VI.-THE SEBASTOPOL RAID
One of the earliest combined movements of the police in pursuit
of the outlaws was not calculated to favourably impress the mind
of the public as regards the capacity of the officers. The
“Sebastopol charge” as it has been designated, and which took
place on the 7th November 1878, proved an utter fiasco,
calculated simply to excite ridicule, and for this
Superintendent Sadleir must be held directly responsible. On the
6th November, a splitter, in a state of intoxication, made his
way from the Woolshed into Beechworth, where he was heard to
boast that three days previously he had seen the gang in the
bush near Sebastopol. This individual was conveyed to the
lock-up, where he reiterated his statement to Superintendent
Sadleir, and indicated where he believed the outlaws were
secreted. Mr. Sadleir telegraphed to Mr. Nicolson, at Benalla,
the information. Captain Standish happened to be with the
Assistant Commissioner of Police at the time, and it was
arranged that, taking with them a party of police, they should
both proceed immediately by special train to Beechworth and
accompany Superintendent Sadleir to the spot where he seemed
sanguine of catching the Kellys. The Benalla contingent arrived
at
Beechworth at 3 am., and were met by Mr. Sadleir, who
communicated to Captain Standish the information he had
obtained, and then all rode off, leaving the Assistant
Commissioner behind, searching for a horse, which occupied some
time. The cavalcade moved rapidly forward, and as it proceeded,
its numbers were gradually increased by parties of troopers who
were gathered from various directions, until the force present
numbered, according to various computations, from 23 to 50. The
noise of so large a body of horseman, clattering along a hard
road in the early hours of the morning and in the clear
atmosphere of the ranges, was described by one witness as “just
like thunder,” and could have been heard a mile off. Indeed,
everything was done as though it were desirable to give the gang
- supposing that they were in the neighbourhood - timely warning
of the approach of the police. What followed was perfectly in
keeping with the haphazard organisation of the party. It was not
until the party had arrived opposite the house of Sherritt,
senior, that Mr Sadleir informed the Assistant Commissioner of
the precise object of the expedition, whereupon arrangements
were made for the attack. While Mr. Nicolson and Mr. Sadleir
rushed the hut where the outlaws were supposed to be concealed,
the Chief Commissioner took up a position at a distance, in
charge of the reserve force. The hut was duly searched, but
nothing to excite suspicion was discovered. A second hut
adjacent was pounced upon after a similar fashion with a like
result. The procession of horseman then moved on to Mrs. Byrne's
house, but here again the police were doomed to disappointment.
The entire proceedings of the day were little better than a
travesty; and as indicating the extent to which discipline
prevailed in the force, it may be mentioned, that not a single
witness could positively state which of the officers present was
actually in the command of the party.
VII.-INSPECTOR BROOK SMITH IN PURSUIT
The conduct of Inspector Brook Smith while in charge at this
period cannot be too severely censured. The history of the
expedition which started on the 6th November 1878 from
Wangaratta to search the Warby Ranges discloses culpable
negligence and incapacity on the part of Mr. Smith, who was the
officer in command. In the first place, he failed to take the
proper steps with a view to the verification of the rumour that,
on the morning of the 3rd November, the gang had been observed
riding under the One-mile Bridge, at Wangaratta, in the
direction of the ranges. Two days were allowed to elapse before
starting in pursuit. Then, when the unmistakable tracks of the
outlaws were discovered and Kennedy's horse found, this officer
deliberately disobeyed orders by returning with his party to
quarters. The following morning, from sheer laziness, he kept
his men waiting from 4 am. till 7. The next day they had to
start without him. With no other apparent object than that of
retarding the pursuit, he compelled his men to make unnecessary
detours to follow up the tracks; he rode slowly, loitered in the
rear, and altogether so conducted the affair that only one
conclusion can be arrived at as regards his conduct, namely,
that he was determined that his party should not overtake the
outlaws. What renders his action all the more reprehensible is
the fact that upon no occasion throughout the pursuit, from the
murders at the Wombat to the final affray at Glenrowan, was
there presented a more favourable prospect of capturing the
gang. Sergeant Steele was most blameworthy in this matter. If,
as has been frequently urged, the men and more particularly the
sub-officers were allowed to act upon their own discretion, upon
the receipt of reliable intelligence, then surely it was the
clear duty of Sergeant Steele, when informed by Constable Tuomy
of the gang's appearance, to have immediately gone in pursuit.
When the circumstance was communicated to him, he at once and
rightly surmised that the men seen crossing the creek were the
gang, and that they were guided by Steve Hart. The tracks were
plainly discernible; he had a large body of armed troopers under
his command, and was then actually engaged in the search for the
outlaws; it was only men flying for their lives that would have
attempted the passage of the creek at the time; the murderers
and their horses were completely exhausted, owing to the journey
to and from the Murray; so that, had this sub-officer acted with
vigour and judgment on the
occasion, he must have been instrumental in effecting the
capture of the gang, and preventing tho loss of life and the
large expenditure of money which was subsequently incurred in
bringing about the extermination of the gang. It would be unjust
to lay down as a general principal that an inferior officer may
be punished for the laches of his superior, but the
circumstances of this case are exceptional. No one better than
Sergeant Steele the personal peculiarities and unsuitability of
Mr. Brook Smith for the work, and to have referred his informant
to that officer was simply an attempt to evade responsibility.
VIII.-PROVISIONING THE OUTLAWS
A Pentridge inmate, named Williamson, who had been implicated in
the assault upon Constable Fitzpatrick, and sentenced to a long
term of imprisonment, imparted some very important information
to the authorities shortly after the Wombat murders. His first
communication was dated 30th October 1878. In this he gave
certain particulars respecting the gang, their haunts, probable
whereabouts, and their mode of obtaining supplies of provisions
while hiding in the ranges. Attached to the statement was a
rough pen-and-ink sketch, or plan, of the position and
surroundings of Mrs. Kelly's hut at Eleven-mile Creek and its
relation to a large hollow log, not far distant, which was
likely to be used as a receptacle of food for the use of the
outlaws. Search was made for the log, and it was found by
Senior-Constable Flood without much difficulty. It was lying
about 400 or 500 yards distant from the Kelly's hut, and in a
spot suitable for secreting provisions. The suggestion made by
Williamson - indeed the action that common sense would have
dictated - was to watch the log, when discovered, and endeavour
to cut off the outlaws' supplies, or possibly trace them to
their lair. This course was not adopted. From the appearance of
the hollow log, Senior-Constable Flood came to the conclusion
that it could not have been utilized as indicated, and so the
matter rested. About the same time a secret agent informed Mr.
Sadleir that Mrs. Skillion, the sister of Ned and Dan Kelly, was
in the habit of preparing large quantities of food which she
conveyed into the bush at night, returning in the morning with
her horse completely exhausted. She was not, however, interfered
with. It was stated in evidence that attempts were made to
follow her, but the difficulty of doing so without skilled
trackers was thought insurmountable, and all efforts to trace
her nightly expeditions to their source were relinquished. The
evidence given by Superintendent Sadleir upon this point is
unsatisfactory, and favours the hypothesis that the officers
depended upon fortuitous circumstances rather than upon any
defined plan of operations to bring about the capture of the
outlaws.
IX.-THE EUROA BANK ROBBERY
The authorities received from the prisoner Williamson another
important statement, dated 15th November 1878, in which it was
intimated that the kelly gang would probably attack one of the
banks at Seymour. This information was communicated to
Superintendent Hare on the 26th November, and that officer took
immediate steps in his own district to guard against such an
eventuality. On the 28th the document reached the hands of the
officers in Benalla, and on the following day Mr. Nicolson
telegraphed to the Chief Commissioner, suggesting that the
police at Seymour should be reinforced. It seems clear that at
this time rumours were current that one or other of the banks in
the district would be robbed; and it has not been satisfactorily
shown that Mr. Nicolson or Mr. Sadleir took any precautions to
frustrate an attempt of that nature if made in the North-Eastern
district. Indeed, their action indicates that they were either
ignorant of the rumours or attached no importance to them,
although the witness Patrick Quinn asserts, in the course of his
evidence, that some time prior to the robbery he informed the
Assistant Commissioner not only as to the locality in which the
Kellys were secreted, but that one of the banks at Bright,
Avenel, or Euroa would probably be attacked. That the force at
the command of the officers in charge of the district was
inadequate to resist the threatened raid in every centre of
population in the district was apparent. Nevertheless it has not
been satisfactorily proved, from the documents or the evidence
submitted to your Commissioners, that Mr. Nicolson realized the
danger and applied for reinforcements. There is a document,
dated some eight or nine months later, written by Mr. Sadleir,
in which he alleges that application had been made to the Chief
Commissioner for additional police prior to the attack upon
Euroa, and Mr. Nicolson, in cross-examination, reiterates the
statement, but beyond these mere assertions we have no proof
that any special effort was made at this time to protect the
banks in the North-Eastern district. Further, at a very critical
juncture, and in the teeth of the most emphatic warning, both
officers left head quarters at Benalla and proceeded to Albury
on the 9th December 1878. The journey thither appears too have
been the result of a ruse on the part of the sympathizers of the
gang. The precise object of the officers in starting was simply
to reconnoitre by daylight the crossing of the Murray, near
Albury, where it was stated by a supposed reliable agent that
the Kellys were expected to pass. Before starting an incident
occurred which might have induced them to pause, if not to
forego their intention. Mr. Wyatt, PM., arrived from Euroa by
the evening train, bringing with him incontestable proofs that
the telegraph wires in the vicinity of the township had been
deliberately cut, and direct communication with Melbourne
destroyed. Mr. Wyatt appears to have argued the matter out in
his own mind, from all the circumstances which came under his
notice, that the cutting of the wires was probably the work of
the Kelly gang; and as soon as he observed Mr. Nicolson on the
platform, at Benalla, he at once communicated to him his
suspicions. Unfortunately Mr. Wyatt had warned the driver of the
engine and others in the train by which he had arrived not to
disclose any information they possessed on the subject, so that,
when they were interrogated by Superintendent Sadleir as to
whether there was anything wrong down the line, they returned a
distinct negative. The warning of the police magistrate was
disregarded. Turning to him, Mr. Nicolson said, “It will not
alter our plans,” and, getting into the train, he and Mr.
Sadleir took their departure for Albury. When passing Glenrowan
station another incident occurred, which appears to have
attracted the attention of Mr. Sadleir. When the train arrived
at Glenrowan, Mr. Sadleir observed a suspected sympathizer and
scout of the gang watching their movements; and, from this
action and the expression of his face, it was evident that
something unusual was stirring. This fact flashed through Mr.
Sadleir's mind in the train on the journey to Albury, but he
neglected to communicate with Sergeant Whelan, at Benalla, so as
to place him on the Qui vive, as he might have done on arriving
at Wangaratta or at any of the stations along the line. A
strange and unfortunate fatality appears to have attached itself
to every phase of this remarkable episode. There was, at the
time of the robbery, virtually no police protection in Euroa.
The constable, the only one stationed there, had been absent
from the township during the day; and it was not until late in
the evening, when doing duty at the railway station, he
ascertained that the outrage had been committed, whereupon he
leaped into the train and proceeded to Benalla. It seems also
clear that for some days prior to the raid the outlaws were
either in the township or secreted in its neighbourhood, and
that their scouts gave them full information of its unprotected
condition, so that they could push their audacity to any limits
without fear of molestation. Mr. Nicolson was at Albury when, at
midnight, he received intelligence of the robbery, and he took
steps to return immediately by special train. En route he issued
instructions to the several police stations, in order to ensure
co-operation in the pursuit. Some stress has been laid upon the
telegrams despatched to Sub-Inspector Pewtress, conveying
instructions as to the course he should adopt; but - apart from
the fact that if any doubt existed in the mind of Mr. Pewtress
as to the propriety of acting upon the orders received he had
full power to decide for himself what was best to be done - a
careful scrutiny of the telegrams does not bear out the
allegation that the Mansfield contingent were instructed to
proceed in a direction the opposite to that in which there was a
possibility of the gang with their plunder being encountered.
The efforts made to follow up the tracks by Mr. Nicolson and his
search party on the day following the robbery proved utterly
futile, and they were compelled, from sheer exhaustion and
inability to trace the outlaws, to return to quarters in the
afternoon.
X.-CAPTAIN STANDISH AND SUPT. HARE IN CHARGE OF THE PURSUIT.
Mr. Nicolson was relieved from duty in the North-Eastern
district, owing to the state of his health, immediately after
the Euroa bank robbery, and Captain Standish and Superintendent
Hare took charge of operations. One of their first acts was to
enforce the provisions of the Felons Apprehension Act by
arresting a large number of the more notorious sympathizers. By
the orders of Captain Standish the responsible sub-officers and
men in charge of stations who had for any length of time been in
the Benalla district were collected. They were asked the names
of the persons suspected. Those were taken down by Mr. Hare,
and, without any effort to obtain information for the purposes
of the prosecution, the necessary legal machinery was put in
motion to make the arrests. In making these arrests no proper
discretion was exercised. Several persons were taken into
custody against whom no evidence could be obtained, while a
number of persons known or suspected of being in close and
intimate relations with the gang were allowed to remain at
large. As a consequence, when the cases were called on, remand
after remand was applied for and granted, until finally the
magisterial bench at Beechworth discharged the prisoners. Those
apparently arbitrary proceedings were not salutary in their
effects. They did violence to people's ideas of the liberty of
the subject; they irritated and estranged probably many who
might have been of service to the police; they failed to allay
apprehensions of further outrages on the part of the gang, or to
prevent them from obtaining the requisite supplies; they
crippled the usefulness of the officers, who had to be called
away from active duty in connection with the pursuit to attend
the petty sessions at Beechworth, when remands were applied for;
and, what was of more significance, the failure of the
prosecutions led the public to believe that the conduct of
affairs was mismanaged. The original intention of the gang,
after the Wombat murders, seems to have been to leave the
colony, but this object having been frustrated, owing to the
flooding of the Murray, they returned to the vicinity of their
homes. Finding that the police were utterly at fault as to their
whereabouts, and were receiving no reliable information as to
their movements - that they were simply exhausting their
energies in dragooning the district on purposeless expeditions -
the gang gained confidence, and settled down in the ranges,
varying their retreats, as occasion arose, between the
neighbourhood of the King River, the Woolshed, near Sebastopol,
and the Warby Ranges. The first detachment of the Garrison
Artillery was forwarded from Melbourne to the North-Eastern
district, 15th December 1878, and were distributed in the
townships along the line of railways where another raid on the
banks was possible. In January reinforcements of the artillery
were sent to Beechworth, and in March following, it was deemed
desirable to place a number in Shepparton. A considerable
accession of strength was thus made to the available police at
the disposal of Superintendent Hare, who appears to have
attended to field work while Captain Standish transacted office
business. The first cave party was formed at this time, and was
taken command of by Superintendent Hare in person. It was
maintained for a month, during which the party endured
considerable hardships, having to remain concealed in the ranges
in the neighbourhood of the Woolshed during the day, and watch
the hut of Mrs. Byrne at night, on the chance of pouncing on one
or other of the outlaws. At the end of 25 days the camp of the
police was discovered by Mrs. Byrne, whereupon, without having
accomplished anything, Superintendent Hare returned to Benalla.
At this period Aaron Sherritt, no doubt in the hope of securing
the reward offered for the capture of the outlaws, attached
himself to Mr. Hare and his party, and great reliance appears to
have been placed upon his fidelity. His acquaintance with the
movements of the police in all parts of the district,
communicated by bush telegraphs, demonstrated his knowledge of
the operations of the sympathizers, and doubtless of the
movements of the gang; but he did not enable the authorities to
thwart the outlaws' raid upon Jerilderie on the 10th of February
1879. The daring with which this outrage was committed, and the
impunity with which the gang were allowed to swoop down upon a
township, to bail up the police, to rob one of the banks, and
return to their haunts in Victoria, marked this episode as one
of the most extraordinary in the whole career of the outlaws.
Superintendent Hare
conducted many search parties with vigour, and in addition to
watching Byrne's house, kept active supervision over the houses
of others who were supposed to be sympathizers. He undertook
expeditions to the Warby Ranges; he led search parties to
Cleary's house, and to the Whorouly races respectively, on the
strength of information supplied by agents, but without success.
What Captain Standish accomplished by his personal supervision
and direction of affairs in the district does not appear
manifest. He was supposed to attend at the office during the day
and act upon information received from scouts, but beyond having
visited Mr. Hare and remained with him one night during the
existence of the cave party, he seems to have contented himself
with rusticating peacefully in Benalla. Evidence has been given
by several witnesses that the Chief Commissioner was not an
ardent worker in connection with the Kelly business. He has been
described as apathetic, and as seeking refuge in a novel when
his officers referred to matters relating to the pursuit. Mr.
Hare states that the Chief Commissioner was always willing to
converse with him upon the subject, but other officers declare
that the apathy of the Chief Commissioner was the subject of
frequent conversation. As a matter of fact, when in July 1879
Captain Standish and Superintendent Hare returned to Melbourne,
owing, as the former alleges, to the business of the head office
being in a “frightful muddle,” the authorities were uncertain
whether the outlaws were actually in the colony or had gone
northward, in the direction of Queensland. An analysis of the
list of appearances during the time Captain Standish and
Superintendent Hare were in charge shows that the number
reported was 53. Of these, 23 are stated to have been untrue or
unreliable; in 5 instances the news was considered too stale; in
four, no steps were taken; inquiries were simply instituted in
several cases, and in 13 alone were active measures adopted,
without any practical outcome.
XI.-THE QUEENSLAND TRACKERS
Early in December 1878 Mr. D. T. Seymour, the Queensland
Commissioner, offered to place a number of native trackers at
the service of the Victorian Government. The proposal did not
meet with acceptance at the hands of Captain Standish. After the
Jerilderie raid, however, the necessity for employing skilled
trackers became obvious, and the Chief Commissioner's objections
were overcome upon the representations of his officers. A
telegram, dated 15th February 1879. was accordingly despatched
to Mr. Seymour, at Brisbane, asking him to send down a party of
eight trackers, under the command of a competent officer. The
terms as regards remuneration and mode of working the contingent
were soon arranged, and, on the 6th of March ensuing, Inspector
O'Connor and his blacks arrived at Albury, where they were met
by Captain Standish, who accompanied them the remainder of the
journey to Benalla. Mr. O'Connor's instructions were that he was
to obey the orders of Captain Standish, and co-operate with the
members of the Victorian or New South Wales police, with whom he
might be required to serve, while at the same time he was to
communicate as opportunity arose with the Commissioner of Police
in Brisbane. In fact, however Inspector O'Connor may have been
regarded, he never held the position of an officer in the
Victorian police. He stood in the relation of a volunteer,
subject to the regulations and discipline of the force for the
time being, simply holding the rank of an officer in a foreign
service, his commission being recognized as a matter of courtesy
by those with whom he was co-operating. In Mr. Seymour's memo.,
Inspector O'Connor was expressly informed that “he merely went
as an assistant and that the conduct of affairs was entirely in
the hands of Captain Standish and his officers; and that, in
obeying orders, he freed himself from responsibility for
anything beyond his own acts.” Mr O'Connor was not appointed to
any particular position in the Victorian police; he was sworn in
and remained exclusively in charge of the Queensland trackers.
The arrangement was anomalous, and much of the difficulty and
misunderstanding that afterwards arose might have been avoided
had Mr. O'Connor been gazetted an officer in the Victorian
police. For some months after the arrival of the Queensland
trackers cordial relations appear to have subsisted between
Captain Standish and Inspector O'Connor. Then dissension arose,
and much bitterness of feeling was engendered in consequence of
a personal quarrel with one of the officers. On the 11th of
March, a week after the arrival of the trackers, they were
despatched with Mr. O'Connor in pursuit of the gang. As showing
the friendly feeling entertained towards him at this period, it
may be mentioned that he was placed in command of the party
alluded to, although he was accompanied by Superintendent
Sadleir, an officer of higher grade. Mr. O'Connor was desirous
of going out with only a few Victorian troopers attached to his
party, but the Chief Commissioner, for certain reasons, was
averse to this arrangement, and sent a much larger number. This
expedition, which was intended to test the powers of the
trackers, resulted in demonstrating their usefulness to some
extent; but, at the same time, it showed that, being natives of
a warmer climate, they were not well adapted, even when supplied
with suitable clothing and covering at night, to endure severe
weather or the physical hardships incidental to carrying on
operations in the ranges. They returned to quarters earlier than
was expected, principally owing to this circumstance. Corporal
Sambo, one of the contingent, died in a few days afterwards,
having succumbed to the effects of congestion of the lungs. On
the 16th of April following, Mr. O'Connor and his party again
proceeded in pursuit, but on the fifth day out they were
recalled by the Chief Commissioner for the purpose of placing
the trackers at the disposal of Superintendent Hare, who was
supposed to have obtained an important clue to the whereabouts
of the gang in the Warby Ranges. This appears to have been the
last occasion upon which, during the period Captain Standish
remained in charge of the district, Inspector O'Connor went out
in command of a party. This, together with the fact that the
Chief Commissioner declined to work the trackers in accordance
with the views of Mr. O'Connor, no doubts served to bring about
the estrangement which arose between those officers. The Chief
Commissioner at no time refrained from expressing his
disparaging estimate of the value of the Queensland trackers.
They had been engaged contrary to his wishes and his judgment.
He believed them to be wholly unsuitable for tracking in broken
and mountainous country, more especially as they required a
considerable quantity of impedimenta, could work but slowly, and
were therefore the more liable to attract observation. In a
district like that in which the pursuit was conducted, and
having to cope with men who frequently rode from 60 to 70 miles
in one night, it was believed by Captain Standish that the
trackers were utterly useless, and that their engagement was an
idle expenditure of money. In withholding information from the
officer in charge of the trackers, in connection with the search
of Cleary's house, a slight was thereby implied; and, by making
Superintendent Hare a party to the transaction, the Chief
Commissioner adopted the most effectual means of sowing discord
amongst the officers. He also deliberately informed Mr. O'Connor
that he intended to catch the Kellys without his assistance;
and, by his general demeanour, according to the evidence,
displayed a want of kindly and generous feeling towards Mr.
O'Connor, who as a stranger and a volunteer sent specially by
the Government of a neighbouring colony to assist the Victorian
police, was the more entitled to courtesy and consideration.
While Captain Standish entertained this opinion of the trackers,
it must be noticed that Mr. Hare, Mr. Sadleir and other
competent authorities who had practical experience of the value
of their work, bore favourable testimony to their abilities and
usefulness.
XII.-MR. NICOLSON RESUMES CHARGE
OF THE PURSUIT
When, in July 1879, Mr. Nicolson resumed charge of the pursuit,
the prospect of capturing the outlaws appeared more remote than
ever. The alarm caused by the daring outrages of the gang had to
some extent subsided, but a strong feeling of indignation
prevailed throughout the country at the spectacle presented of
four young men, three of them only about twenty years of age,
defying all the resources and powers of the Government, and
remaining in almost undisturbed tranquillity in what one of them
described as their mountain home. As indicating the condition of
the district and the influences at work to shield and assist the
gang, it may be mentioned that not even the offer of 8,000
pounds for their capture, to any appreciable degree, facilitated
the operations of the police. Weary of the delay in effecting
the capture, and concerned at the enormous outlay incidental to
the pursuit, pressure appears to have been brought to bear
immediately on Mr. Nicolson taking charge to effect reductions.
The Garrison Artillery were gradually withdrawn, while the
strength of the police in the district was also considerably
reduced, as will be seen from the following returns:-
Number of Officers and Police stationed in the North-Eastern
district and the extra expenditure incurred during the period
Captain Standish and Superintendent Hare were in charge, and for
the seven months after Mr. Nicolson resumed command.
|
UNDER CAPTAIN STANDISH & |
UNDER MR. NICOLSON |
|
SUPERINTENDENT HARE |
|
|
|
Men |
Extra Expense |
|
Men |
Extra |
|
Dec. 1878 |
217 |
2,197 |
July 1879 |
156 |
1,049 |
|
Jan. 1879 |
201 |
1,748 |
Aug. 1879 |
153 |
1,057 |
|
Feb. 1879 |
213 |
1,856 |
Sept.1879 |
155 |
707 |
|
Mar. 1879 |
196 |
2,296 |
Oct. 1879 |
155 |
860 |
|
Apr. 1879 |
198 |
1,433 |
Nov. 1879 |
154 |
356 |
|
May 1879 |
191 |
1,342 |
Dec. 1879 |
155 |
497 |
|
June 1879 |
174 |
1,180 |
Jan. 1880 |
157 |
440 |
It must be borne in mind that these returns are irrespective of
the Garrison Artillery, who were stationed in the district while
Captain Standish remained in Benalla, and whose presence and
co-operation were no doubt of great importance at that time.
Prior to the Euroa bank robbery Mr. Nicolson appears to have
lost faith in the utility of search parties exclusively; and his
coadjutor, Superintendent Sadleir, emphatically pronounced the
system to be mere “fooling.” The Assistant Commissioner thus
explains the position in which he was placed at this juncture,
and the steps which he found it necessary to take. “I set to and
reorganized the men on this basis, and adopted the view that,
with the materials at my command, my best course to adopt was to
secure places from outrage where there was treasure, so that the
outlaws would be baffled in any attempt to replenish their
coffers. I stationed a small body of men at Wodonga, under
Sergeant Harkin, another at Wangaratta, under Sergeant Steele,
another at Bright, under Senior-Constable Shoebridge, and the
same at Mansfield, under Sub-Inspectors Toohey and Pewtress. At
each of these there was barely strength enough for a search
party, but they could make up a fair party - seven or eight - by
calling in men from neighbouring stations. The only place where
a complete search party was kept was Benalla. I instructed the
police throughout the district to arrange to get quietly from
two to four townsmen of the right sort who would turn out and
aid them in the case of an attack.” Mr. Nicolson adds, that he
had not carte blanche for expenditure as Captain Standish had.
He had no money placed to his credit. He paid the accounts and
all other expenses out of his own pocket, which were afterwards
refunded. Large economies were also effected as regards the keep
and hiring
of horses and the expenses attached to the use of buggies by
those engaged by the police. At the same time systematic efforts
were made throughout the district to induce the well-disposed
portion of the population to aid the police by every means in
their power, and to afford any information respecting the
outlaws that might come to their knowledge. This in time began
to bear good fruit. At first the intelligence gleaned would be
about a month old, then it was reduced to a fortnight, in time
about a week, and sometimes a day only would elapse, before the
receipt of news of the appearance of the gang, or the doings of
their sympathizers. In fact the Assistant Commissioner appears
at this time to have relied almost solely upon secret agents for
information, and a reference to the list of reported appearances
shows that his plan of operations so far was producing some
effect. It was not, however, until he had been six weeks in
charge that he obtained positive and reliable information that
the Kellys were in the district. Special stress has been laid
upon several incidents which mark the administration of affairs
by Mr. Nicolson, to which it is desirable notice should be
directed. On the 27th September 1879, Superintendent Sadleir,
while at Wangaratta, was informed by the agent known as Foote
that on the previous night he had seen Ned Kelly and the other
members of the gang in the bush. They were on foot, and of their
identity there could not be any doubt. Mr. Nicolson, on being
informed of this, at once telegraphed to Mr. Sadleir, from
Benalla, instructing him to bring the man down. This order was
not complied with, Mr. Sadleir explaining that he had left his
informant drinking at a public house, and that he would himself
be able to find the precise spot where the outlaws had been
seen. Upon being questioned upon this point, Mr. Sadleir's
knowledge was found to be vague; and Mr. Nicolson, under the
circumstances, took no action. This was the occasion upon which
the search party had assembled in the barrack yard at Benalla,
with their horses saddled and ready to start, when at the last
moment they were ordered back to quarters. In the following
memo., dated 30th September 1879, Mr. Nicolson thus explains to
the Chief Commissioner his reasons for adopting this course:-
The informant was ______; he stated he saw five men. From
conversation with Superintendent Sadleir, upon his return from
Wangaratta, it did not appear that “the spot was indicated so
that it could be found without difficulty,” nor that “it could
be taken up by the trackers at daybreak before the people were
moving” and had become conscious of the presence of the police
among them. The subsequent examination of Mounted-Constable Ryan
as to the locality and its approaches did not tend to remove the
above impression. It appeared that the neighbourhood was
settled, and that our party could hardly expect to pass Lloyd's
house, even at midnight, without being discovered, and that the
trackers might have to search over at least a quarter of a mile
before finding the footprints; and considering the precaution
said to have been taken by the men seen by ______ in sending a
man to dog him home, it seemed likely that they had taken the
other precaution of moving off, and, with the fifth man and
other friends, each had taken separate directions, so that the
trackers pursuing might find themselves running down one wrong
man. Sub-Inspector O'Connor was of opinion that the chance of
success was a bad one. Considering my other improving sources of
information, I determined, upon this occasion, not to disturb
the false sense of security into which the outlaws have been
lulled. Although I decided upon the above course upon the merits
of the report made to me, yet I may remind the Chief
Commissioner that ______, the informant, was the man who tried
to induce me to proceed with the Benalla police and meet him at
the head of the King River on the day before the Euroa bank
robbery.
The informant was Pat Quin, whose loyalty to the police Mr.
Nicolson appears to have always doubted; but there seems every
reason to believe that had Mr. Sadleir taken the precaution to
bring with him the agent his statement would have been acted
upon, and the officer in question have escaped the
responsibility of the expedition being abandoned owing to his
action. The tactics adopted at this time appear peculiar, and,
perhaps, account to some extent for the apparent listlessness of
the police. Mr. Nicolson was desirous, he alleges, of lulling
the gang into what he terms a false sense of security. He was
gradually forming round them a cordon, not of police but of
secret spies, and was anxious not to allow them to know of the
information he possessed, or of the precise nature of his plans,
lest they should leave the district - where he felt assured they
would ultimately be taken - and seek refuge in the inaccessible
region near Tomgroggin, in New South Wales. The immediate object
was not so much to effect the capture as to guard against any
renewal of a raid upon the banks. The relative merits of the two
systems adopted by the police in connection with operations
against the Kelly gang, namely, that of search parties and of
secret agents, have been frequently referred to in the course of
the evidence. The name of Mr. Hare has been more particularly
associated with the former, and that of Mr. Nicolson with the
latter. As a matter of fact, however, both systems were employed
conjointly as occasion arose, but, from instinct and peculiarity
of temperament, Mr. Hare seems to have preferred the more active
and military mode of prosecuting the pursuit; while Mr. Nicolson
trusted principally to the effects likely to arise from having
the outlaws surrounded with spies and informers. One of the most
peculiar features of Mr. Nicolson's administration of affairs
during the period of his second charge was the nature of his
transactions with the Sherritt family. Jack, the youngest
brother, appears to have acted faithfully to the police while
engaged by them; and there seems no doubt that from time to time
he gave them important and reliable information respecting his
frequent intercourse with Dan Kelly and Joe Byrne. He was
introduced to Mr. Nicolson by Detective Ward, at Wangaratta, on
the 12th September 1879, and from the information which he then
gave, and the letters which he subsequently brought from the
outlaws, it was evident that he was in close communication with,
and was implicitly trusted by them. They were in fact anxious to
induce him to join them in an attempt to rob one of the banks in
the district. Sherritt seems to have told everything very
unreservedly to Mr. Nicolson, who nevertheless decided on each
occasion to wait for a more favourable opportunity in the hope
of capturing the entire gang at one blow. This policy of
procrastination was more especially noticeable on the occasion
of Sherritt's interview, when he informed Mr. Nicolson of Dan
Kelly's visit to his place at Sebastopol on the 13th November
1879, leaving word that he would call again about eight o'clock.
Both witnesses agree as to the facts, but there is a marked
difference as to the precise hour at which the interview
occurred, and upon this point the material value of Jack
Sherritt's information hinges. According to his evidence, he
left the Woolshed in time to interview Mr. Nicolson about
half-past seven o'clock, and as the outlaws called at his place
at eight, it has been urged that there was ample time for a
party of police to have proceeded there, if not to encounter the
gang direct, to have at least obtained such a clue to their
whereabouts as would probably lead in the end to their capture.
As against the evidence of Jack Sherritt, however, there must be
taken, not only the denial of its accuracy, as given by Mr.
Nicolson, but several other circumstances which deserve
consideration in weighing the value of the testimony given pro
and con. Jack Sherritt states that Dan Kelly called at dusk.
According to the almanac, the sun, on the 13th November 1879,
set at 6.45. The outlaw is said to have searched the house,
looking for Jack; he remained, say ten minutes. Sherritt was
working in a paddock, half a mile away. It must have taken his
sister thirty minutes to have brought him the information. The
distance into Beechworth was three or four miles through rough
country, which took Senior-Constable Mullane three-quarters of
an hour to ride. Ten minutes may be allowed for the recital of
the intelligence to Mr. Nicolson. Supposing then that Dan Kelly
called at Sherritt's at seven o'clock, these intervals bring up
the hour to 8.35 pm. before Mr. Nicolson was in a position to
order out a search party to go in pursuit. It would occupy say
ten minutes getting a search party together, saddling the
horses, and preparing to start, and, by going by the main road,
the ground might be covered in about twenty-five minutes. It
would, therefore, be after nine
o'clock before the men by any possibility could have reached the
spot. But the probabilities are against the entire gang having
called according to promise. It was well known and can be easily
understood that they never kept an appointment punctually.
Again, as comparing oath with oath, there is on the one side a
young man not particular as to dates, who, at the time,
according to his own admission, was greatly agitated, thinking
that the outlaw had called to carry him off, and disposed to
make the most of his case, when before the Commission, as
against the Assistant Commissioner. On the other, there is a
trained official, accustomed to accuracy in matters of detail,
who wrote the circumstances of the interview at the time in his
memorandum book, and who, some days afterwards, wrote a long
letter to the Chief Commissioner, in which he elaborates the
narrative, and distinctly declares that it was late when
Sherritt called at the station. Again, as indicating that
Sherritt may have been mistaken in this as in other points, he
alludes to Mr. Nicolson looking up from the desk at the clock
and making some remark about the hour. As a matter of fact there
was no clock in the room where they were conversing; the only
clock in the station was fixed in the verandah and could not be
seen from the room. Early in December 1879 Mr. Nicolson
organized the second cave party; the secret was revealed by
Senior-Constable Johnson to Mr. Hare, at the depot, and the
latter at once informed Captain Standish on the subject. The
Chief Commissioner did not approve of those parties, and wrote
to Mr. Nicolson to that effect, stating that the cave was known
at the depot. The announcement caused surprise and pain to the
Assistant Commissioner, who, however, refused to withdraw the
men, believing that their presence in the hut, although known at
the depot, remained a profound secret in the district. There is
a reason to believe that, during the existence of the cave
party, the outlaws frequently visited the Woolshed, and that
being so it must be inferred either that the gang were in
possession of the secret and carefully avoided Mrs. Byrne's
house, or they visited the place, as has been asserted, unseen
by the police, who were supposed to be on the watch. The
testimony of the constables bears out the supposition that the
men's presence in the cave was known for a considerable time
before they were removed, and the conduct of Detective Ward
favours the conclusion that he deliberately deceived Mr.
Nicolson upon that point, by the manipulation of the reports
sent in by several of the constables. In February 1880, a report
was received by the police that a number of mould-boards of
ploughs had been stolen from the neighbourhood of Greta and
Oxley. It was not then known what the object of these
depredation's was, but a search party and two trackers were sent
out, and upon this occasion was discovered the footprints with
the “larrikin heel,” which, with other information, indicated
that the Kelly gang were the thieves. The “diseased stock”
letter, in which the object of the stolen mould-boards was
communicated for the first time, was dated 20th May 1880, and
this marks an epoch in the history of the pursuit. In that
letter it was stated, “a break out may be expected, as feed is
getting scarce.” It was the receipt of this intelligence that
gave Mr. Nicolson hope that the “beginning of end” was
approaching. The outlaws were evidently preparing for a raid,
and it was only necessary to be prepared to receive them.
Doubtless the consciousness of this served to embitter Mr.
Nicolson's feelings when he found himself obliged to relinquish
the pursuit and yield to another the post of honor when he daily
anticipated the fruition and reward of his labours. About the
months of May and April the police ascertained that the outlaws
were reduced to great straits. Over a year had elapsed since
their last - the Jerilderie - raid. Their funds were well-nigh
exhausted. With their money, their friends and sympathizers
began to fall off too; and more than one, it was stated, had
significantly suggested that another bank should be robbed. The
outlaws at this time were said to be usually in the vicinity of
the Greta Swamp, from which they would move back to the ranges,
get across the Ovens River towards Sebastopol, and from thence
to the Pilot Range, near Wodonga. They were obliged to travel on
foot, and their immediate assistants were reduced to four.
Intimation was also received that they were suffering such
severe hardships in the ranges that they were obliged to obtain
a tent to cover them at night; and the agent who gave all this
valuable information led Mr. Nicolson to believe that, in a very
short time, he would lead the police to the spot where they
would have, to use the language of the Assistant Commissioner,
“their hands on the throats of the outlaws without any trouble.”
Information of this character at the time must have appeared
very general,
very indistinct, and its reliability very problematical, which
may account for the fact that more practical measures were not
adopted. When on one occasion, about this time, a search party
was despatched to a hut near the Lloyd's house at Lake Rowan, on
the strength of somewhat similar intelligence, the police by
their efforts simply subjected themselves to badinage, as when
the suspected hut was searched, only a well-known sympathizer
was found there. It must be added that every precaution seems to
have been taken to intercept the gang, should they attempt to
pass any of the bridges, or crossings leading to or from their
reputed haunts. Sealed orders, with special instructions were
issued to every station; constant telegraphic communication was
maintained throughout the district; the vigilance was apparently
incessant, but was sought by the Assistant Commissioner to be of
a masked, unostentatious, character, which it was believed would
in time achieve success. An analysis of the list of appearances
discloses that during Mr. Nicolson's second charge there were
about sixty reports received by the police; of those, sixteen
were considered stale or unreliable; inquiries were made as
regards five; there is no record of action in reference to six;
in several no action whatever; and in twenty six, action was
taken mainly with a view to resisting attacks, the arranging of
watch parties, or in endeavouring to induce the outlaws to
suppose that the police were not on the alert. There were very
few search parties despatched, and in every instance where
action was taken of this nature the expeditions proved entirely
fruitless.
XIII.-MR. NICOLSON'S RECALL
The Assistant Commissioner takes no pains to conceal the opinion
that his removal in June 1880, although ostensibly the direct
act of the Executive, was in reality the result of official
intrigue. Whatever may have been the influences at work -
whether, as Mr. Ramsay declared, the decision of the government
meant no more than a desire for a change of bowlers, or, as has
been insinuated, Captain Standish, for reasons of his own, was
responsible for the move - of this there cannot be a doubt, that
there was thereby revealed the existence of acrimonious feelings
amongst the officers - of jealousy, distrust, and personal
rivalry, of which nothing previously had been positively known,
although perhaps suspected. There is no gainsaying the fact that
the recall of Mr. Nicolson implied dissatisfaction, if not
censure; but the fact of his having received a month's grace at
a time when, according to his own account, he was in daily
anticipation of capturing the Kellys, indicates some
consideration for his feelings. Public servants are not always
the best judges of the motives which actuate a Government in
adopting a particular policy, and unfortunately private
interests and individuals must often be sacrificed to public
expediency. Mr. Nicolson evidently regarded his case as a hard
one under the circumstances. He states that, for some time prior
to his removal, he felt that there was mischief brewing. On the
22nd of April the Assistant Commissioner had an interview with
the Chief Secretary, who was then returning from the ceremony at
Mansfield of unveiling a monument erected to the memory of the
victims of the Wombat tragedy. Mr. Ramsay expressed the greatest
pleasure and confidence in Mr. Nicolson when informed of how
things were going on. An anonymous letter, which has been
frequently adverted to in evidence, was forwarded by the Chief
Commissioner to Mr. Nicolson on the 26th April for his
explanation, and in a week subsequently he received intimation
that he was to be superseded. The so-called anonymous letter was
signed “Connor,” evidently a fictitious name. It criticised
unsparingly Mr. Nicolson's character and conduct throughout the
pursuit, and from internal evidence it was clearly written or
inspired by some member of the force. It had been forwarded in
the first instance to the Honorable J. H. Graves, the member for
the district, and by that gentleman placed in the hands of the
Chief Commissioner. The witness Wallace, a State-school teacher,
and an alleged sympathizer with the gang, was the putative
writer of the document, but he denies the allegation, and
subsequently, in a communication addressed to your Commission,
he declares that it was the joint concoction of Jack Sherritt
and the outlaws, in order to have Mr. Nicolson removed from the
district. But Wallace's bona fides and veracity are open to
grave
suspicion, and his flippancy of manner, when before your
Commission, apart from the evidence respecting his equivocal
relations with the gang, mark his statements as wholly
unreliable. The Assistant Commissioner, when informed of the
intention to remove him, sought an interview with the Chief
Secretary early in May, when, upon his urgent representations,
he obtained a month's extension of his charge of the district.
The scenes which occurred between Mr. Nicolson and Captain
Standish at this period indicate exacerbation of feeling and
defiance on the one hand, and of cold superciliousness on the
other, utterly at variance with that esprit de corps which is so
desirable amongst brother officers. During the last month Mr.
Nicolson remained in command he strained every nerve to make the
most of the limited time allowed him. His last effort was made
on the strength of a report by a secret agent, that Joe Byrne
had been seen in the ranges, to the rear of his mothers hut. Mr
Nicolson organized and led a search party to the spot. It was
upon this occasion that Aaron Sherritt accompanied the
expedition as a guide during daylight - a proceeding that has
induced many to attribute the murder of Aaron Sherritt to a want
of discretion on the part of the Assistant Commissioner. The
fact, however, should not be forgotten, that some time
previously Byrne had seen Mrs. Sherritt at Sebastopol, and had
threatened to shoot Aaron. At the end of the month, Mr. Nicolson
in the interim having failed to effect the capture of the
outlaws, Mr. Hare was sent up to supersede him. This latter
officer remonstrated with Captain Standish for having selected
him for the duty, and appealed to Mr. Ramsay with a view to some
other officer being appointed to the post. The only reply that
he received was that the Government had determined that he
should take charge, and that there was left him no other
alternative than to obey orders. The interview between Mr.
Nicolson and Superintendent Hare on the 2nd of June 1880, when
the latter took over charge, is variously described by the
witnesses who were present. Superintendent Hare emphatically
declares, and inserted a statement to the same effect in his
official report after the affray at Glenrowan, that the
interview lasted only ten minutes, and that Mr. Nicolson “gave
him no verbal information whatever.” Mr Sadleir speaks of a
quarter of an hour or twenty minutes, but, in cross-examination,
goes further. Mr. O'Connor thinks that the interview lasted much
longer, while Mr. Nicolson insists that Superintendent Hare
remained with him in the office nearly an hour; that during that
time he gave him all the information he possessed, and, in
conclusion, asked Mr. Sadleir if he thought he had omitted
anything. Mr. Hare, in support of his allegation, produces his
diary, and Mr. Nicolson relies, to a great extent, upon the
corroborative fact that the train by which his successor arrived
reached Benalla at ten minutes past eleven; that it took him
about half-an-hour to reach the police station; and it is
admitted upon all hands that the interview did not terminate
until one o'clock, when the officers adjourned to their hotel
for luncheon. A more serious charge than that levelled by Mr.
Hare against Mr. Nicolson it would be difficult to define,
amounting as it does to disloyalty to the service and the
country, and meanness and treachery to brother officers; and if
Mr. Hare at the time considered Mr. Nicolson guilty of such
conduct, it was his duty to have at once reported the
circumstance. He wrote, it appears, a private letter to Captain
Standish informing him of his impressions, but such a course was
not calculated to meet a case of such grave significance as Mr.
Hare represents in his official report and evidence. The
Assistant Commissioner indignantly repudiates the charge under
which he had been allowed to labor for over twelve months, and
appeals to his long service and the respect entertained towards
him by his brother officers and men in refutation, urging that
he would be even more criminal than the Kellys themselves if
there were the least foundation for the charge. It must be
mentioned that Mr. Hare was the first to leave the room in which
the interview occurred; that he called again at the office in
the afternoon without asking for further information; and that,
if the interview were briefer than might have been expected
under the circumstances, it was owing to Mr. Hare having asked
Mr. Nicolson, in the course of conversation, to come to the last
that had been heard of the outlaws. The telegram despatched by
Mr. Nicolson to Senior-Constable Mullane prior to his leaving
Benalla for Melbourne seems to have strengthened Mr. Hare's
suspicion of mala fides on the part of the Assistant
Commissioner; but, judging from the explanations made, and the
tenor of the document itself, there does not seem sufficient
grounds for preferring so grave a charge against Mr. Nicolson as
having wilfully sought to coerce the agents, and obstruct the
efforts of the officer by whom he had been superseded.
XIV. SUPERINTENDENT HARE SUPERSEDES
MR. NICOLSON.
Superintendent Hare having mastered the documents in the office
which had a bearing upon the pursuit, and having also obtained
every information and assistance from Superintendent Sadleir,
preceded to make his own arrangements. Reliable residents and
constables in charge of stations were interviewed; scouts were
despatched; secret agents communicated with, and what has become
known as the hut party organized. Four constables under the
direction of Detective Ward were secreted in Aaron Sherritt's
hut, at Sebastopol, with instructions to remain concealed during
the day, and in the evening to proceed to Mrs. Byrne's place and
watch it at night, as the cave parties had done previously. From
the evidence it is clear that the constables acted very
indiscreetly, situated as Aaron Sherritt's hut was, in close
proximity to the main road and within view of numerous dwellings
in the neighborhood. The first impression of your Commissioners
when they visited the scene of the murder was its unsuitability
for such a purpose. Again, the constables were known to have
gone out to cut wood during the daytime and were, there is every
reason to believe, seen by the gang and their sympathizers in
the vicinity. Whatever suspicions there may have been engendered
in the minds of the outlaws as regards Aaron Sherritt's
treachery towards them previously, the fact of his harboring the
police in his hut was sufficient to seal his doom. On the
evening of the 26th of June 1880, while the police were in the
hut, and as they were about to start on their nocturnal watch, a
knock was heard at the door, and a neighbor named Anton Wicks,
as though he had been bushed, inquired the way to his home. The
door was opened by Aaron Sherritt. That moment a shot was fired;
a second followed; Aaron stepped back, and fell dead without
uttering a word. Three of the constables at the time were in an
inner room divided off from the main apartment by a slight
partition, which only reached from the floor to the lower edge
of the roof, a door composed of flimsy material being in the
centre. The front and back doors faced each other. There were
two small windows in the hut, one giving light to the bedroom,
the other to the kitchen. The hut in reality consisted of only
one room with a portion partitioned off for the purposes of a
bedroom. Constable Duross was at the fire in the outer room when
the knock was heard; he at once sought refuge in the bedroom,
where he and his companions remained throughout the night. The
murder was perpetrated by Joe Byrne, assisted by Dan Kelly. The
outlaws made several inquiries as to the men concealed in the
bedroom, but the evidence upon the subject is contradictory and
unsatisfactory. The names of the police present were Constables
Armstrong (in charge), Duross, Dowling, and Alexander. Never was
there a more conspicuous instance of arrant cowardice than was
exhibited by those men on the night of the murder. Instead of
attacking the outlaws, or at least making some effort out of
sheer regard for their manhood, if not for their official
responsibility, they sought the protection for themselves which
they should have afforded to others. Two of them, Armstrong and
Dowling, lay prostrate on the floor, with their bodies partly
concealed beneath a bed, under which they had thrust the wife of
the murdered man, with their feet resting against her, so that
she could not possibly escape, in the hope that her presence
would deter the outlaws from shooting them or attempting, as
they had threatened, to set fire to the place. The conduct of
those constables throughout the night was characterized by
shameful poltroonery, which, in the army, would have been
punished by summary expulsion from the service with every
accompanying mark of contempt and degradation. It was not until
the afternoon of the following day that the authorities in
Benalla and Melbourne became aware of the outrage. As soon as
information of the murder was received, prompt action was taken.
The black trackers, who, with Mr. O'Connor, had been withdrawn
from the district, preparatory to returning to Brisbane, were
recalled, and despatched the same night by special train from
Melbourne to Beechworth, the object being to utilize them in
following the tracks of the outlaws from Sherritt's hut, at
Sebastopol, to the ranges in the vicinity, where the murderers
were supposed to be concealed.
XV.-GLENROWAN
The murder of Aaron Sherritt was designed as the prelude to the
terrible tragedy by means of which the outlaws intended, as they
had previously boasted, to astonish not only the Australian
colonies but the whole world. It seems manifest that they had
carefully thought out and matured their plan of operations. They
proposed in the first place to shoot Aaron Sherritt. By this
they rightly conjectured that they would, not only have wreaked
their vengeance upon one who had betrayed them to the police,
but would induce the authorities to despatch on the following
day - Sunday - when there was no ordinary traffic on the line, a
special train to Beechworth with the Queensland trackers and a
large body of police. Next, it was determined to wreck this
special train, and shoot any constable who might escape the
effects of the disaster. Finally, the coast having been thus
cleared, the gang were to proceed at once to Benalla or one of
the townships in the district, rob one of the banks, and with
the spoil retrace their steps to their previous haunts in the
ranges. By one of those unforeseen accidents which often defeat
the best laid schemes, execution of the latter portion of their
program was frustrated, and their career suddenly brought to a
close. The murder was perpetrated by only two of the gang, Joe
Byrne and Dan Kelly. Their task accomplished, they rode with all
speed across country to Glenrowan, where Ned Kelly and Steve
Hart were occupied in preparing for the destruction of the
train. The outlaws established themselves in Mrs. Jones's hotel,
which stood in an oblique direction, about 400 yards south-west
of the local railway station, and between the line and the Warby
Ranges. Thither Ned Kelly and Hart conveyed the persons whom
they had bailed up during the day, the intention being to keep
them in duress until the special had passed. At an early hour on
Sunday morning the rails were torn up by two men named Reardon
and Sullivan, with a threat of being shot by Ned Kelly in case
they refused to act as directed. The spot selected for the
castrophe is about 1000 yards north of the Glenrowan station, at
a point where the line, after passing through a deep cutting,
suddenly makes a sharp curve. Here there is on one side, to the
west, a high embankment, which shuts out the view ahead as the
point is approached; and on the other a steep declivity, down
which it was intended to precipitate the train. The members of
the gang were somewhat abstemious during the day. Steve Hart was
drunk in the morning, but he soon recovered, and he alone
appears to have taken any liquor to excess. They established
very friendly relations with their prisoners, of whom, towards
evening, there were no less than 62. They joined in outdoor
sports, got up a dance during the night, played cards, indulged
in some vocal music, and otherwise amused themselves while
awaiting the arrival of the train which was expected to pass
Glenrowan about midnight. Mr. Curnow, the local State School
teacher, who, with his wife and sister-in-law, had been bailed
up early in the afternoon, contrived by a show of sympathy to
ingratiate himself into the good graces of the gang; and, under
Providence, to his tact, coolness, and bravery, must be
attributed the rescue of the special train and its occupants
from destruction. Constable Bracken, who was stationed in the
locality, was taken prisoner and conveyed to the hotel late in
the evening. He appears to have acted with prudence throughout
the trying circumstances in which he was placed. Mr. Curnow was
released about midnight, and immediately took steps to warn the
approaching special train. He improvised a danger signal by
placing a lighted match behind a scarlet mantle, and with this
he set out along the line to meet the train. The special,
containing Mr. O'Connor, his wife, and sister-in-law, five
trackers, and several representatives of the press, arrived at
Benalla at about half-past one o'clock. Here Superintendent Hare
and a party of troopers joined them, and having procured a pilot
engine to go in advance, a start was made for Beechworth at 2.10
am. On arriving within a mile and a half of Glenrowan, the pilot
engine was observed to stop, and upon inquiry as to the cause,
the information given by Mr. Curnow of the presence of the
Kellys at Glenrowan, and of the rails having been torn up, was
communicated to Superintendent Hare. After a consultation, it
was decided to travel slowly and cautiously, and bring the train
up to the Glenrowan station. Under ordinary circumstances, the
special would have passed Glenrowan without stopping. When
therefore the outlaws heard the whistle, and observed the train
draw up at the station, they were at once convinced that Mr.
Curnow had conveyed the warning to the police. The prisoners in
the hotel having
been locked up, the outlaws at once prepared for the fight. They
went into a room together and assisted each other to don the
iron armour that they had brought with them, and thus equipped
they awaited the attacks. Superintendent Hare ordered the horses
to be taken out as soon as the train drew up at the station. He
did not know the precise bearings of the locality, and supposed
that the spot where the rails were torn up was about a mile from
the station, and that it would be necessary to proceed there on
horseback. A volunteer, Mr. Rawlings, undertook to act as guide.
Mr. Hare and Mr. Rawlings, followed at a distance by three or
four constables, went down the line to the station master's
house to make inquiries. At this time everything was still;
there was not a sound or a sign to indicate that the gang was so
near. Mrs. Stanistreet, the wife of the station master, was
found crying in great distress at the loss of her husband, who,
she stated, had been taken away by the Kellys, at the same time
pointing in the direction of the ranges behind Mrs. Jones's
hotel. Thereupon Mr. Hare returned to the platform, and while
engaged giving further instructions about the horses, Constable
Bracken, in a state of excitement, appeared upon the scene and
informed Mr. Hare that the outlaws were in Mrs. Jones's hotel,
and had a large number of prisoners there bailed up. Thereupon
Superintendent Hare told the men to let go the horses and to
follow him. Without pausing, he rushed away, in the direction
indicated, across the open space formed by the railway reserve,
at the corner of which, directly opposite the hotel, is a large
swing-gate with a wicket. He was closely followed by Constables
Gascoigne, Phillips, and Canny, Inspector O'Connor and some of
his black trackers bringing up the rear. On emerging from the
wicket, Superintendent Hare and the constables mentioned found
themselves on the roadway opposite the south-east corner of the
hotel, which, although it was moonlight, stood in the shade, so
that it was with difficulty objects could be discerned. When
about fifteen paces from the hotel Superintendent Hare saw the
figure of a man on the verandah. Then three men came round from
the off side of the house and drew up. These were the outlaws,
who, trusting to their armour, appeared to regard themselves as
invulnerable. A shot was fired from the verandah, followed by a
volley. The police at once returned the fire, and several
volleys were exchanged, but in the very first Superintendent
Hare received a bullet wound in the left wrist, which rendered
his arm useless. The ball passed through the limb, shattering
the bone and severing the artery. Mr. Hare with his one arm
reloaded and fired. Several volleys having been exchanged, the
outlaws retired within the house, when the shouts and screams of
men, women, and children, imprisoned in the place, called forth
the order from Superintendent Hare, and it is said from Mr.
O'Connor also, to cease firing. Mr. Hare's wound appears to have
become very painful, so, turning to Senior-Constable Kelly, who
had reached the spot by making a detour round by the railway
crossing, near the station master's house, he directed him to
surround the house with the men and not allow the outlaws to
escape. He then retired, going in the direction of the station.
On his way thither he observed Mr. O'Connor, as he alleges,
“running up a drain.” He informed him of his accident, at the
same time repeating the orders he had already given to
Senior-Constable Kelly. Inspector O'Connor warmly resents the
statement contained in Mr. Hare's official report that he saw
him “running up a drain.” Probably, it is the contemptuous form
of expression employed to which Mr. O'Connor objects. As a
matter of fact, there seems no reason to doubt the accuracy of
Mr. Hare's description. Mr. O'Connor, it is clear, did not
accompany Mr. Hare and the others who passed through the wicket
or cross the fence surrounding the railway reserve. In the
vicinity of the gate the ground is intersected by a number of
watercourses, varying in depth from half a foot to seven feet.
Those are in places spanned by small foot bridges, and all, more
or less, in their sinuous windings communicate with each other.
At the moment that the first volley was fired, Inspector
O'Connor appears to have reached the culvert within the
enclosure, in a direct line with the front of the hotel, or
perhaps a little more towards the Wangaratta side of it, and
about twenty-five yards distant from the house. Finding the
danger of remaining in an exposed position, he at once sought
shelter in a depression in the ground, in front of the bridge.
To save himself from the bullets, which were flying about in
every direction, it was requisite that he should assume a
crouching attitude, and if, as Mr. O'Connor asserts, he remained
in this position for nearly half an hour after the firing
commenced, it was here he must have been observed by
Superintendent Hare on his way returning to the platform.
Whatever may have been the length of time Mr. O'Connor remained
in this spot, it is certain that the position, having been found
insecure, owing to the woodwork in front of the culvert having
been struck by several bullets, Mr. O'Connor rose, crossed the
little bridge, descended into the watercourse, which increases
in depth at the other side, proceeded along this until some 15
or 20 yards back he reached a half-moon shaped excavation in the
bank, which served him for all the purposes of a rifle pit. Here
he took up his position, along with two of his trackers, the
distance from the hotel being between 40 and 50 yards. The
accounts given are so conflicting, and based, seemingly, upon
after occurrences, that it is difficult to pronounce decisively
as to the precise point of time at which Superintendent Hare saw
Mr. O'Connor on his way back to the station; but as nearly all
the witnesses agree that Mr. Hare was not more than from five to
ten minutes in the front, it seems probable that he must have
sighted Mr. O'Connor in his first position as he describes and
before the Queensland Inspector had sought the more secure
shelter of the spot where he remained until Mr. Sadleir's
arrival. Mr. Hare, on reaching the platform, had his arm
bandaged by Mr. Carrington, one of the representatives of the
press, and he then left the station with the intention of
resuming his position at the front. Great loss of blood, and
consequent physical exhaustion, prevented him from doing so. He
states that he felt great pain, and as the blood continued
dripping from his wrist he became faint. He was clearly
apprehensive of bleeding to death, and in this extremity he is
said to have called to Mr. Rawlings - “For God's sake, Rawlings,
go and get me a horse, or anything that will carry me to
Benalla, where I can have my wound dressed properly.” He was
observed sitting near a log not far from the fence by Constable
Kirkham, but finding it necessary to return to the station,
Superintendent Hare re-appeared there after an absence the
second time from five to eight minutes, according to the
evidence of the reporters. He fainted and fell down on reaching
the platform. He was then lifted, placed in a railway carriage
along with the ladies, who administered some sherry, under the
influence of which he shortly revived. He then arranged to be
sent to Benalla by one of the engines, and this was done. Here
ends the first phase of the Glenrowan affray. Superintendent
Hare, when he took his departure from the scene, appears to have
been under the impression that he left Mr. O'Connor in charge of
the attack. No doubt such was his intention, but Inspector
O'Connor seems throughout the morning to have been animated by
but one idea, namely, that by remaining in the deep cutting
where he had sought shelter he was guarding the front of the
premises, thereby cutting off all chance of escape for the
outlaws from that quarter. A little reflection, however, would
have led this officer to see that, if the outlaws did attempt an
escape, they were not likely to select the front, where they
would have had to run the gauntlet between the various parties
of police stationed there. If an escape were attempted at all,
it was more likely to have been by the rear of the hotel, where
the ground was covered with timber and scrub, while the Warby
ranges were only a short distance off. Therefore, instead of
standing in the cutting, blazing away every time a flash was
seen from the hotel, Mr. O'Connor might just as well have been
on the platform along with the ladies, the reporters, and other
non-combatants. Indeed the appearance of the ladies at such a
juncture was somewhat incongruous. It was a mistake to have
allowed them to accompany the party from Melbourne, and, as a
fact, their presence seems to have had the reverse of an
inspiriting influence upon the officer in charge of the
Queensland contingent. He held his position until the arrival of
Superintendent Sadleir and the reinforcements from Benalla.
About the same time Sergeant Sleele arrived from Wangaratta with
his contingent, having ridden down with the greater part of
them, a few proceeding by train. Mr. Sadleir, on reaching the
ground, sought Mr. O'Connor, and consulted with him. After the
first volley some of the female prisoners in the hotel escaped;
but at the time Sergeant Steele took up his position, close to
the rear of the hotel, Mrs. Reardon and some members of her
family endeavored to make their escape. Mrs. Reardon, who had a
child in her arms covered with a shawl, states distinctly that
Sergeant Steele deliberately fired at her, and produced, before
the Commission, a shawl perforated apparently by a bullet.
Steele denies the allegation; but admits having shot young
Reardon who, it is asserted, neglected, when ordered, to put up
his hands. The ball or pellet fired entered his breast, and
lodged beneath the ribs, but did not cause death. Indeed, the
firing
at this time, by all accounts, seems to have been
indiscriminate, the blacks particularly being industrious in
potting away at the premises. The prisoners, in a state of
terror, arranged to hold out a white handkerchief, at which
several shots were immediately fired, a proceeding highly
reprehensible, as the most untutored savage is supposed to
respect the signal of surrender. The order was given to fire
high, but not before one of Mrs. Jones' children and a man
named Martin Cherry were wounded, the latter fatally. About
seven o'clock, Ned Kelly, the leader of the gang, was captured.
He had been wounded in the foot during the first brush with the
police. He left the hotel by the back shortly after, and
selected his own horse, which he led away into the bush at the
rear. On the way he seems to have dropped his rifle and the
skull cap that he wore inside his iron headpiece, not far from
the house. He then seems to have endeavoured to disencumber
himself of his armour, but, being unable to do so without
assistance, he evidently made up his mind to break through the
cordon of police, rejoin and die with his companions in the
hotel. His capture was effected without much difficulty or
danger, as he was wounded in several parts of the body, and was
incapacitated from using his revolver with effect. As the tall
figure of the outlaw, encased in iron, appeared in the
indistinct light of the dawn, the police for a time were
somewhat disconcerted. To some it seemed like an apparition;
others thought it was a black man who had donned a nail-can for
a joke, but as the shots fired from Martini-Henry rifles, at
short range, were found to have no effect, the sensation created
seemed to have been akin to superstitious awe. One man described
it as the “devil,” another as the “bunyip.” Ned Kelly advanced
until within a stone's throw of the hotel, when, in the
vernacular of the bush, he defied the police, and called on the
other members of the gang to come out of the hotel and assist
him. The lower portion of his body being unprotected by armour,
the shots soon began to tell. The one that brought him to the
ground was fired by Sergeant Steele, who then rushed forward,
grappled the outlaw, when both fell to the ground. What followed
precisely is confused and indistinct. However, it seems clear
that Senior-Constable Kelly, Guard Dowsett, Constable Dwyer, and
others, were early in at the capture of Ned Kelly, who, having
been overpowered and divested of his armour, was conveyed to the
railway station a prisoner, where he remained until the close of
the fight. The male prisoners were allowed to escape at ten
o'clock. They conveyed the intelligence that Joe Byrne had been
shot dead early in the morning, while toasting prosperity to the
gang at the bar of the hotel. The other outlaws, Dan Kelly and
Steve Hart, had last been seen standing in the passage, both in
armour, no doubt in their last extremity, considering as to what
should be done. It has been asserted by various witnesses that
spasmodic attempts at firing from the hotel were kept up till
one o'clock that day; but viewed by the light of surrounding
circumstances and subsequent information, it seems probable that
there was little, if any, firing on the part of the survivors of
the gang after the prisoners left at ten o'clock. In the
forenoon, when the police were firing high and firing low,
according as they were directed, Superintendent Sadleir appears
to have evolved from his own inner consciousness - an idea which
he was desirous at first of crediting the reporters and
subsequently Dr. Nicolson with, namely, to blow down the hotel.
He telegraphed in the forenoon to the Chief Secretary in
Melbourne, asking him to send up to assist in the siege a big
gun with the necessary ammunition and men to demolish the hut. A
cannon and the requisite appliances were despatched by train,
but owing to a stoppage on the line were detained, as Captain
Standish was, until too late to be of any service.
Superintendent Sadleir was seen several times during the day -
once talking with Mr. O'Connor, the latter leaning against a
tree reading a newspaper; again going round to some of the men,
again talking to Ned Kelly, and on several occasions smoking his
pipe at the railway station. He was pressed by several
constables to allow them to rush the hotel, but he refused on
the ground that not a single man should lose his life if he
could help it in capturing the rest of the gang. The
Superintendent was very probably influenced by humane motives in
arriving at this decision, but a dispassionate observer could
not fail to couple this inactivity with a want of capacity, if
not courage, to deal with the difficulty. Of course, if an
attack were made, as suggested, the officer in charge was in
honor bound to take the lead, so that if there were danger in
having recourse to such an expedient, the spectators could not
be blamed if they thought more of Mr. Sadleir's discretion than
any other quality that he displayed on that
very trying occasion. The spectators were clearly not impressed
with a very elevated opinion of the police proceedings on that
day. The Very Revd. Dean Gibney's evidence upon the point is
conclusive. Towards four o'clock, that is, after a state of
siege had been maintained by three outlaws against nearly fifty
police for about fourteen hours, Superintendent Sadleir
consented to allow the hotel to be fired. This was accomplished
by Senior-Constable Johnson. The Rev. Father Gibney was the
first to enter the burning building. He found the bodies of the
three outlaws with life extinct, and judging from appearances,
Steve Hart and Dan Kelly, having taken off their armour,
committed suicide, knowing death to be inevitable. The body of
Joe Byrne was taken out before it was reached by the flames. The
unfortunate man Cherry, one of the men bailed up by the outlaws,
and who was wounded early in the fight, was taken out also, and
died in a few minutes. The place was then abandoned to the
flames, and these having done their work the charred remains of
Dan Kelly and Steve Hart, with the body of Joe Byrne, were
subsequently recovered and handed over to relatives for
internment, while Ned Kelly was conveyed to Melbourne, and, some
months subsequently, tried, convicted of the Wombat murders, and
executed.
FRANCIS LONGMORE, Chairman;
WILLIAM ANDERSON,
JAMES GIBB,
GEORGE WILSON HALL,
GEORGE RANDALL FINCHAM,
GEORGE COLLINS LEVEY.
JAMES WILLIAMS,
Secretary.
PROTEST A
In signing the Second Progress Report of the Police Commission,
I beg to enter my protest against the decision of a majority of
the Commission in their finding in Clauses three and five.
1. Because, in my opinion, it is in direct contradiction of the
evidence taken before the Commission in that portion of clause
four in which it states, “But nothing special has been shown in
his action that would warrant the Commission in recommending his
retention in the force.”
2. It is proved in evidence that Mr. Hare, after the murders at
the Wombat, was zealously engaged at the depot in Melbourne in
selecting the best men and horses and sending them to the
North-Eastern district.
3. When informed by Captain Standish that the outlaws intended
sticking up one of the banks, he at once took steps to protect
those in his district, viz., Seymour, Avenel, Nagambie. See
Questions Nos. 1244, 1245, and 1246.
4. After the Euroa bank robbery M. Hare was sent to the
North-Eastern district with Captain Standish, Mr. Nicolson, who
had been up to that time in charge, returned to Melbourne. He
remained there for about seven months, but no reliable
information was obtained as to the whereabouts of the outlaws.
During the greater part of that time he pursued the same system
as that followed on previous occasions in this colony when the
police were in search of bushrangers, by keeping search and
watch parties continually scouring the country. With these
parties he took his full share of the hardships endured, and by
so doing ensured the confidence and support of the men under his
charge. During this time he was twenty-five days and nights with
his cave party watching Mrs. Byrne's house; the result of all
this arduous work told on his constitution, and he broke down
under it, and asked to be relieved from duty in that district.
This was conceded, and he returned to Melbourne, being relieved
by Mr. Nicolson.
5. In April 1880, he was informed by Captain Standish that he
would have to again resume charge of the North-Eastern district.
Against this he strongly protested, but was told by the Chief
Commissioner of Police that he must go; he then requested an
interview with Mr. Ramsay, the then Chief Secretary; at this
interview he again protested, and asked that one of his senior
officers should be appointed to undertake this special duty. His
appeal was of no avail. Mr. Ramsay told him that the subject had
been under the consideration of the Cabinet, that the Ministry
had full confidence in his ability, and they thought him the
best officer in the force to undertake the duty, and that he
must go, and if he should succeed in the capture of the outlaws
he would be duly rewarded. See Question 1434.
6. Mr. Hare went to Benalla on the 2nd June 1880, and from all
the information then obtained, the police were as far off the
capture of the outlaws as they were when Mr. Hare left the
district eleven months before. After two or three days looking
round and interviewing the officers and police stationed in the
district, he took steps to stop supplies by friends and
relations of the outlaws. See Question 1477.
7. He then visited the watch party that had been stationed by
Mr. Nicolson at Aaron Sherritt's house, and found it far from
satisfactory.
8. On the 27th June 1880 he received information of the murder
of Aaron Sherritt. See Question 1500.
9. He at once sent a telegram to Captain Standish, asking that
Mr. O'Connor and his black trackers might be sent back at once.
See Question 1501.
10. Captain Standish replied that Mr. O'Connor would be sent by
first train on the following day, Monday.
11. Mr. Hare was not content with this reply, being thoroughly
determined that no chance should be thrown away in his endeavour
to secure the capture of the outlaws. And as this was the first
reliable information he had obtained of their whereabouts during
the whole time he had been in charge of the district, he felt
that no time should be lost. He therefore sent another telegram
to Captain Standish, “That if Mr. O'Connor and his trackers did
not come that night it would be no use their coming on the
Monday.” To this
he received reply that Mr. O'Connor and his men would be sent
that night by special train. Mr. Hare then made all necessary
arrangements for the police and horses to be ready to go on by
the special coming from Melbourne, also providing for a pilot
engine. And on the way up from Benalla he took every precaution
against surprise from the outlaws, such as sending the pilot
engine in front, stationing his men on the engine, and in every
way acted as an active, intelligent, and determined officer.
When the train was stopped by Mr. Curnow, he appears, if
possible, to have taken extra care until their arrival at
Glenrowan Station, when, from the statement made by Mr. Curnow
to the man on the engine, he expected that the outlaws would be
at some distance. He ordered the horses to be taken out of the
train, and whilst this was being done a light was seen in the
station master's house, to where he proceeded; and from what he
heard there he thought the outlaws had taken to the Warby
Ranges. On his return to the railway station, Constable Bracken
made his appearance, having just escaped from Jones' Hotel,
where he had been kept a prisoner by the gang. This was the
first information Mr. Hare received that the outlaws were so
near. I think his conduct at this time is worthy of all praise,
for he at once started direct for the hotel, ordering his men to
let the horses go and follow him. When within sixteen yards of
the building, they were fired on by the outlaws; the firing was
returned by the police, and kept up by them until the gang
retired into the hotel. In the first fire he received the wound
in his left wrist, but still he stood his ground, and fired
several shots. From the evidence there can be no doubt in this
first engagement both Ned Kelly and Joe Byrne were wounded.
12. The warder at the gaol says that Ned Kelly told him that Joe
Byrne received a wound in the first engagement with the police,
and this is corroborated in the declaration made by Constable
Phillips, where he states, “I heard a conversation between Ned
Kelly and Joe Byrne, shortly after taking up my position around
the hotel, in which both admitted being wounded.” It is known
that Ned Kelly had a bullet in his foot, another through his
arm, and his thumb badly cut with shot when he was captured.
13. After the outlaw had retired into the hotel Mr. Hare found,
from his disabled arm, that he would be compelled to return; he
called on his men to cease firing, and ordered Senior-Constable
Kelly and Mr. O'Connor to surround the building and not allow
the outlaws to escape; he then returned to the railway platform,
when his wound was bound up by the reporters. After this was
done he again returned to the field and remained some time, but
feeling that he was becoming faint from loss of blood, he was
compelled to leave the scene of action, and on arrival at the
station it was found necessary, to save him from bleeding to
death, to at once send him back to Benalla to obtain surgical
attendance. His conduct, on arrival at Benalla, shows clearly
that his duty to the public service received his first
attention. He first got the railway guard to go and inform Mr.
Sadleir what had happened.
14. Then on his way to the telegraph station called on Dr.
Nicholson and asked him to follow and dress his wound. He did
not stop to have it done, but proceeded to the telegraph office,
and telegraphed to Beechworth, Violet Town, Wangaratta, and
Melbourne, informing the police what had taken place at
Glenrowan and asked for reinforcements.
15. When Dr. Nicholson arrived at the telegraph station he found
him in a low and fainting condition. After his wound was bound
up and dressed he was conveyed to his hotel, suffering great
pain.
16. He was laid up for months, his left hand maimed for life,
and after he had sufficiently recovered he returned to his duty
in Melbourne. He did not ask, at that time, for any special
recognition for the arduous work he was called upon to perform,
and the plucky and determined way in which he had acquitted
himself at Glenrowan. He did not ask for any enquiry. He felt
that by a fortunate circumstance the gang had come within his
grasp. He took advantage of that, which resulted in the capture
and destruction of the band of outlaws, who, for nearly two
years, set the authorities at defiance; and, for this, it is
recommended by the Commission that he should retire from the
force.
17. I regret that my brother Commissioners should have made this
recommendation, and thereby compelling me to enter this protest
against their decision; but feel that I would be
doing violence to my conviction were I not to do all that lays
in my power to protect a public officer and a gentleman from an
act of great injustice, and the loss of a valuable servant to
the public.
18. Believing also that if this portion of the Report of the
Commission be acted on it will be attended by disastrous effects
on the police force of this colony, for, in future, what officer
or men in the force will run the risk of distinguishing
themselves in the discharge of their duty if, by so doing, they
are subject to be dismissed, or may have brought on themselves
the bitter jealousy of some of their fellow officers?
19. I have no desire, in making this protest, to compare the
conduct of Mr. Hare with that of any of the other officers in
charge of the North-Eastern district during the Kelly outlawry;
they have been dealt with in the Report of the Commission, in my
opinion, without any more censure than they deserve; and I am,
therefore, more at a loss to understand why Mr. Hare should have
met with such treatment at their hands.
E. J. DIXON.
12th October 1881.
PROTEST B
We must decline signing clauses 3 and 5. We should have
preferred that the motion recommending Mr. Nicolson's
superannuation had not been accompanied by the statement that
“the want of unanimity existing between these officers, ie. Mr.
Nicolson and Mr. Hare, was frequently the means of preventing
concerted action on important occasions, and the interests of
the colony greatly suffered thereby,” inasmuch as we do not
consider that the latter statement is borne out by the evidence,
and a resolution to that effect was moved in the course of the
deliberations on the report. Nor do we see anything in the
evidence to warrant the recommendation that Mr. Hare should be
superannuated.
JAMES GIBB.
GEORGE COLLINS LEVEY.
REPLY TO MR. DIXON'S PROTEST
1. We, the undersigned Commissioners, in submitting a reply to
the statement put forward in the form of a protest by Mr. Dixon,
cannot refrain from expressing our surprise and regret that the
document in question should be found a mere paraphrase of
portions of Superintendent Hare's official report, which has
been the source of so much mischief, and which we have no
hesitation in declaring to be, in its essential features, a mere
tissue of egotism and misrepresentation.
2. Your Commissioners have no desire to question Mr. Hare's
personal courage or determination; the decision arrived at
respecting this officer, we contend, has been based upon much
more important considerations, namely, those of public
expediency and the interest of the service.
3. Before proceeding to traverse the allegations contained in
the official report and reproduced in the protest, we feel it
incumbent upon us to make some reference to Superintendent
Hare's conduct in connection with the present demoralized state
of the police force of the colony.
4. There seems every reason to believe that Superintendent Hare
was throughout in direct collusion with Captain Standish in the
petty and dishonorable persecution to which Mr. Nicolson was
subjected for many years while endeavoring honestly to discharge
his duties to the best of his ability. Superintendent Hare
admits that the late Chief Commissioner consulted him upon
everything; one of the witnesses declared that Superintendent
Hare was regarded as the actual head of the force; under such
circumstances, how can Superintendent Hare be exonerated from
all responsibility for the strained relations that existed
amongst the officers?
5. Captain Standish characterized Mr. Nicolson's reports as
twaddle; Superintendent Hare described them as infernal bosh.
This agreement of opinion is significant when upon examination
those reports are found to deserve a very different appellation.
Had Captain Standish acted properly upon one of those written in
1877, concerning the state of the North-Eastern district, the
Kelly outbreak would probably have been prevented.
6. Superintendent Hare exhibited a spirit of insubordination to
a superior officer in questioning Mr. Nicolson's dictum
regarding Constable Redding, and in the Assistant Commissioner's
presence coinciding with Captain Standish when the latter was
informed that Constable Gorman was not a suitable man for a
particular station. Further, as showing Superintendent Hare's
regard for the rules of the service, and the respect due to a
superior officer, it may be added that when in the course of the
enquiry Mr. Nicolson forwarded, as a matter of courtesy, a
communication to Mr. Hare, the reply received, after
acknowledging the receipt of the document, was as follows:- “I
would suggest to Mr. Nicolson the advisability of his devoting
his attentions to answering the serious charges preferred by the
witnesses examined before the Commission against himself instead
of attempting to find fault with my conduct. - Francis Hare,
Supt., 26/9/81.”
7. In the personal feuds and jealousies which have marked the
relations of the police officers, Superintendent Hare appears to
have adroitly sheltered himself behind the late Chief
Commissioner. Further, it is notorious that many of the men have
taken sides with the officers, and that a spirit of rivalry and
dissension exists in the lower ranks of the force.
8. Superintendent Hare's position as officer of the depot gave
him many advantages over his brother officers, which he was not
slow to utilize.
9. Your Commissioners cannot too strongly deprecate the action
by Superintendent Hare to override the decision of the political
head of the department, in order to retain his position as
officer of the depot and avoid being sent to Beechworth. With
very questionable taste, and contrary to the regulations of the
service, he applied personally to Sir George Bowen, the Governor
of the colony, whom he met at a coursing meeting, to intercede
for him and have the order for his removal cancelled. While Mr.
Hare acknowledges to have thus enlisted the highest political
influence on his own behalf, his charge against Mr. Nicolson of
having employed similar means to obtain promotion utterly broke
down, as the Assistant Commissioner appears to have depended
solely for advancement upon his rights of seniority.
10. Superintendent Hare's conduct during the Kelly Pursuit was
marked by anything but a generous or kindly feeling towards Mr.
Nicolson. In paragraph 2 of the protest, Mr. Dixon states that
after the Wombat murders Mr. Hare was zealously engaged at the
depot in selecting the best men and horses to send to the
North-Eastern district. As a matter of fact the reinforcements
came to hand slowly, and the district, at the time of the Euroa
Bank robbery, was unprepared to resist, at all points, the
threatened raid, owing to the inadequacy of the police force
placed at Mr Nicolson's disposal.
11. As regards warning the banks of Seymour, Avenel, and
Nagambie, Superintendent Hare simply obeyed the instructions
given him two days before Mr. Nicolson was apprised of the
existence of the prisoner Williamson's communication, in which
the information was conveyed regarding the intention of the
outlaws to attack the bank at Seymour. Had there been proper
concert between the officers at this period, the Euroa bank
robbery might have been averted. Captain Standish, while he
consulted Mr. Hare, neglected to inform Mr. Nicolson what
arrangements had been made to protect Seymour, and made no
effort to assist him in repelling any attack that might be made
upon the banks in the North-Eastern district.
12. Mr. Dixon, in paragraph 4, states that during the seven
months Captain Standish and Superintendent hare remained in
charge of the pursuit no reliable information was obtained
respecting the whereabouts of the outlaws. To our minds this
fact proves that the officers mentioned were incapable of
grappling with the difficulties of the situation, more
particularly as they had with them double the number of men, and
incurred double the extra expenditure, in prosecuting the
pursuit, allowed Mr. Nicolson.
13. As regards Mr. Hare's health having broken down after his
seven months' duty, it has been proved in evidence that he was
not so incapacitated as to be prevented from attending a series
of coursing matches held in the district prior to his return to
the depot.
14. When Mr. Nicolson resumed charge in June 1879, sweeping
reductions were insisted upon, despite his repeated
protestations; and when he applied for additional men for
ordinary duty to replace those who had been invalided,
Superintendent Hare sent him up from the depot a number of men,
described as cripples, who were utterly useless.
15. While Mr. Nicolson was in charge, Superintendent Hare, in a
manner highly unbecoming an officer, extracted privately from
one of the constables some information respecting the cave
party, and immediately informed the Chief Commissioner, as a
piece of current gossip, that all about the cave was known at
the depot. Further, while Mr. Nicolson was endeavoring to
improve the efficiency of his men by rifle practice, Mr. Hare
interfered, and told Captain Standish that the men were simply
wasting ammunition. Those points may appear insignificant, but
to our minds they indicate a system of tale-bearing undignified
and ungracious and calculated to materially obstruct operations
against the outlaws.
16. Mr. Dixon's statement in Clause 6, that when Mr. Hare went
to Benalla on 2nd June 1880 the police were as far off the
capture of the Kelly gang as when he left the district eleven
months previously, is a reiteration of Superintendent Hare's
assertion, contained in his official report, and is not borne
out by the evidence. The allegation also based upon question
1477 is to some extent misleading. There is nothing in the
paragraph mentioned to show that the steps taken by Mr. Hare
were calculated to prevent supplies being conveyed to the
outlaws.
17. Clause 7 of the protest is calculated to convey a false
impression. The hut party alluded to had not been stationed at
Aaron Sherritt's place by the Assistant Commissioner. During the
last week of Mr. Nicolson's command in the North-Eastern
district, and while scouring the ranges in the vicinity of Mrs.
Byrne's hut, he had placed some men temporarily in Sherritt's
house, but withdrew them prior to Mr. Hare's arrival. The
organization of the hut party properly speaking is due to Mr.
Hare, and it proved a most disastrous failure.
18. We have not been slow to acknowledge Superintendent Hare's
energy and promptitude upon receiving intelligence of Aaron
Sherritt's murder, but the injudicious zeal of his friends
provokes the criticism which he might otherwise be spared. Mr.
Dixon gives him credit for extraordinary foresight in providing
a pilot engine for the special which left Benalla for Beechworth
on the night of the 27th of June, but a reference to
Mr.Carrington's evidence shows
that, prior to the starting of the train, it was generally
known, or at least currently reported at Benalla, that the rails
had been taken up. Under such circumstances what was more
natural than that a pilot engine should be procured?
19. Mr. Hare, as officer in command, should not have tolerated
the presence of ladies in the special train when leaving
Benalla, especially as he was aware of the report that the rails
had been removed.
20. We consider that this officer cannot be complimented upon
his discretion of generalship in the conduct of operations at
Glenrowan for the short time that he remained upon the scene. He
knew little, apparently, of the precise situation of Glenrowan,
notwithstanding that he had been for eight months in command of
the district. He was informed during the journey that the Kellys
had torn up the line, taken possession of the place, and
imprisoned all the people there; yet, on arrival, he seems to
have had no correct idea of the peculiarity of the situation.
The moment he was informed by Bracken of the presence of the
outlaws at the hotel he dashed away, without waiting for some of
his men to collect their arms. When he reached the hut he found
his onslaught resisted by the gang. He was disabled in the wrist
by the first volley, and after an absence of from five to ten
minutes from the platform, he returned to have his wound
dressed. He left the front without transferring the command to
any one. The order to surround the house given to
Senior-Constable Kelly and to Inspector O'Connor cannot be
regarded as transferring the command. This neglect he might have
rectified when he essayed to reach the front on the second
occasion, but he failed to do so. Did he propose to rush the
place, and at once overpower the outlaws? If that were his
intention, he should not have been deterred by a mere wound in
his wrist from doing so. If he had resolved merely to surround
the gang and prevent their escape, then he ran unnecessary risk
in exposing himself and his men to the fire of the outlaws. If,
however, he simply trusted to the chapter of accidents, without
any definite idea of what was best to be done, then his
management of affairs displayed a decided lack of judgment and
forethought. Comparisons may be odious, but it cannot fail to
strike one as singular that, while Superintendent Hare felt
himself obliged to leave his post and return to Benalla, under
the impression that the wound in his wrist would prove fatal,
the leader of the outlaws, with a rifle bullet lodged in his
foot, and otherwise wounded in the extremities, was enabled to
hold his ground, encumbered too by iron armour, until seven
o'clock, when, in the effort to rejoin his companions, he fell
overpowered by numbers.
21. Superintendent Hare's bill against the Government for
surgical attendance amounted to 607 pounds, about 480 pound of
which was paid to his relative, Dr. Chas. Ryan. While this
officer was being petted and coddled on all sides, and a special
surgeon despatched almost daily some thirty miles by train to
attend him, the Government questioned the payment of four
guineas for the treatment of one of the black trackers who had
received a wound in the head at Glenrowan.
22. It is, however, chiefly in relation to Superintendent Hare's
official report of the 2nd of June 1880 that we, the undersigned
Commissioners, have been led to regard this officer's conduct
with suspicion. The document was manifestly written with the
design of crushing Mr. Nicolson once and for all; to deprive him
of all credit for anything that he had done or suffered in the
pursuit, and to brand him as disloyal to the service and his
brother officers. The evidence, however, discloses that many of
the charges contained in the report were unfounded, the
insinuations unjustifiable, and the statements mere assumptions.
23. It must be borne in mind too that Mr. Hare's personal
quarrel with Inspector O'Connor led up to the latter officer's
unfortunate complications with Captain Standish; the favoritism
exhibited towards him by the Chief Commissioner was the cause of
jealousy and dissension amongst the officers. And it is only
fair to conclude that Superintendent Hare has been for many
years a disturbing element in the force, and that his withdrawl
from the service has become a matter of public necessity.
24. We have no desire to act unkindly towards Superintendent
Hare. We regret deeply that, in justice to ourselves and in
explanation of our action, we should be compelled thus to refer
to matters that otherwise had better be buried in oblivion. The
services rendered, and the injury sustained by Superintendent
Hare have not been lost sight of, and, while declaring his
immediate retirement from the force as indispensibly necessary,
the Commissioners have treated him, we consider, in connection
with the recommendation submitted to Your Excellency, with the
greatest possible liberality.
FRANCIS LONGMORE,
GEORGE WILSON HALL,
GEORGE RANDALL FINCHAM,
WILLIAM ANDERSON. |